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In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Phoenix Lodge No. 315 District
15 IAMAW, AFL-CIO

OPINION and AWARD
78K/01324

And
Airco Welding Products
Airco, Incorporated

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate the existing Agreement when it discontinued its employee check
cashing service in May 1977? If so what shall
be the remedy?
A hearing was held on January 9, 1971 at which time representatives of the above named Union and Company appeared and
were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument anc
to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath

was waived.
In February, 1959, the Company changed its method of paying
its employees, from cash to check.

With that change, in March,

1959 it made a check cashing service available to their employees
within the plant, following each pay day.

In May, 1977 (follow-

ing a two month strike by the employees of the check cashing
service, during which the service was suspended) the Company
permanently terminated that service.

Instead, it made arrange-

ments with a bank near the plant to cash employee checks.
The Union contends that the long period of the availability
and use of the check cashing service constituted a practice
which ripened into a contractual benefit, and which may not be
unilaterally withdrawn by the Company.

It asserts that many

employees have relied on the service, have lost personal time,
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incurred some expense and have been inconvenienced by its
cessation.
The Company argues that the check cashing service is not
a contract benefit; that it may be unilaterally withdrawn as it
was unilaterally

installed; that the Company had bona fide

economic reasons to end it; its use by employees had fallen to
no more than one half the work force of the bargaining unit;
and that the nearby bank is an adequate alternative.
It is undisputed that over all these years the collective
bargaining agreement made no express mention of the check cashing service.

Additionally, it is conceeded that the contract

contains no explicit clause preserving "existing benefits," or
any language either integrating past practice into the agreement
or according it the status of a contract benefit.
In the absence of any such foregoing contract provisions
the question simply is whether the availability and use of the
check cashing service for some eighteen years ripened into a
bilateral understanding, the discontinuance of which required
bilateral agreement.
I conclude that it did not.

In my view, the long standing

availability and use of the check cashing service was an exercise
of an express managerial right, and hence not a traditional past
practice.

By specific contract language the Company reserved

the right to determine the "methods of payroll payment."
Article XII, in pertinent part reads:
the methods of payroll payment,
are among other things vested in the
Employers
"

-3There is no dispute that the Company had the contractual
right to change its payroll methods from cash to check.

And

there is no contractual requirement that an in-plant check
cashing service be provided.

That the Company did accompany

its change in payroll payment with a check cashing service was,
in my view, a further implementation of its express managerial
right to determine the "methods of payroll payment."

And that

exercise of that managerial right, as expressly negotiated

by

the parties in the Employer's Rights clause of the contract
continued from 1959 to 1977.

As such, it was not transformed

into a bilateral agreement, nor did it become a benefit protectec
by the contract.
It follows then, that the Company's decision to end the
check cashing service was the most recent exercise of that
managerial right under Article XII of the contract.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD
The Company did not violate the existing
Agreement when it discontinued its employee
check cashing service in May 1977.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: January 22, 1979
STATE OF New York )ss.:
COUNTY OF New York )
On this 22nd day of January, 1977, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION

ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Nurses Rights Organization

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1330 0017 78

and
Beth Israel Medical Center

The stipulated issue is:
What shall be the disposition of the Union
grievance as stated in the grievance submission dated November 16, 1977?
Hearings were held on August 10, 1978 and February 26,
1979 at which time representatives of the above named Union
and Medical Center appeared and were afforded full opportunity
to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

Both sides filed a post-hearing brief or memorandum.

In pertinent part the grievance as submitted by representatives of the Union to the Medical Center, in the form of a
letter dated November 16, 1977 reads as follows:
This letter is submitted as a grievance pursuant to the NRO contract.
The grievance pertains to the vacancy of a
ward clerk on 4A in Bernstein. The nurses
on that unit are filling this vacancy on a
continuous, regular non-emergent basis.
Unit 4B in Bernstein is comparable where a
ward clerk is employed to assume the clerical
functions necessary for the unit to run smoothly.
It is out contention that this is a violation
of Article X of the NRO contract. We further

-2contend that we were correct in initiating
the grievance at Step 2. As the contract
states this is called for if the Supervisor
does not have the authority to resolve the
grievance.
It appears, as the Medical Center asserts in its brief,
that the grievance was not filed within the time limits prescribed in Step 1 of Article XIV (Grievance Procedure) of the
contract.

The ward clerk in unit 4A of the Bernstein Institute

resigned in December of 1976, about eight months before the
first collective bargaining agreement between the parties was
signed.

The grievance was not submitted until three months

following the execution of the contract.

Step 1 of the grievance

procedure requires that non-monetary grievances be filed within
ten days after the occurrence of the facts on which it is based,
and within thirty days if it is a monetary claim.

Assuming the

Union's first notice of the facts in this case when the contract
was executed, the grievance dated November 16, 1977 fails to
comply with either of those time limits.

Step 1 of the grievance

procedure goes on to state that:
"If no such notice is served in the time
specified, the complaint will be barred."
However, because the arbitrability issue was not raised
at the hearing and therefore not subjected to the adversary and
evidentiary procedures thereof, and because apparently it was
not raised by the Medical Center at any time during the processing of the grievance, I conclude that in this case, the Medical
Center has waived that defense.
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Article X Paragraph 1 of the contract, which the Union
asserts has been violated reads:
Out-Of-Title-Employment
1. Limitations, (a) Employees shall not
be required to act out of title in filling vacancies in non-nursing positions
except in emergent circumstances, but may
be required to perform non-nursing functions
to ensure continuity of care.
I conclude that the contract language and the testimony
regarding whether the ward clerk in Unit 4A in the Bernstein
Institute was a "non-nursing position" are respectively ambiguous
and conflicting.

Therefore based on the record I am unable to

determine whether the contract phrase "non-nursing positions"
means as the Union asserts all jobs that are not based on
professional status, or as the Medical Center contends those that
are not part of the Nursing Department.
But; in my judgement, a determination is unnecessary because I am not persauded that the ward clerk in Unit 4A, or any
of the ward clerks in other units that have them acquired an
exclusivity over the various duties which they perform.

Based

on the record I am satisfied that the duties regularly performed
by the ward clerk in Unit 4A prior to her resignation, were also
performed, albeit in lesser amounts than at present, by the
nurses in that unit when the ward clerk was absent, on vacation,
otherwise away from her job, and also when on the job but occupie
with some other specific assignment.

Moreover, and significantly,

-4a number of units in the Bernstein Institute do not have and
never had ward clerks, and the duties which otherwise would
have been undertaken by such a clerk and which are substantially
the same as those performed by the ward clerk in Unit 4A and
now performed by the nurses in that unit, have always been
handled by the nurses and orderlies of those other units.

The

lack of exclusivity of the ward clerk over the disputed duties
was recognized by the Union in the contract negotiations leading to the present agreement.

Union Demand #22 which the

Medical Center did not grant sought:
The provision of a unit clerk at each
MMTP clinic for all regular hours and
on each unit of the Medical Center for
week day shifts.
I construe this demand as meaning that the Union recognized
that clerks were not then employed at each unit; that nurses
and others were performing the duties in question, and that
clerks should be assigned to each unit to relieve nurses of
those assignments.

That the Union failed to obtain this contract

provision means that the various duties assigned to and performed
by ward clerks were and have been also performed by nurses on
a comingled

basis where clerks are present, and by nurses and

possibly other employees exclusively where ward clerks are not
part of the unit complement.
That the nurses in Unit 4A are presently required to allot
a significantly greater part of their time to the clerical and

-5other ministerial duties previously assigned to the ward clerk
does not mean that they are performing work out-of-title.
Rather it means that they are doing more work of the type they
always did.

That constitutes a managerial decision as to what

the nurses are to do within the work day, and though it may not
be the most efficient use of the skills and professional training of a nurse, and may even take time away from patient care,
it is an operational matter, not an out-of-title assignment,
and hence within the narrow jurisdiction of the arbitrator not a
contract violation.
Based on the foregoing it is immaterial and therefore unnecessary for me to decide whether the resignation of the last
incumbent ward clerk on Unit 4A, some eight months before the
contract between the parties was signed, created a "vacancy"
within the meaning of Paragraph 1 of Article X.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD
The Union's grievance dated November 16,
1977 is denied.

DATED: May 29, 1979
STATE OF New York )gg .
COUNTY OF New York )

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

On this 29th day of May, 1979 before me personally came and
appeared Eric J. dchmertz to me known and known to me to be the
individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument
and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Philadelphia Federation of
Teachers, Local #3, AFT, AFL-CIO

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #14 30 0114 78 Q

and
Board of Education of The School
District of Philadelphia

The stipulated issue is:
With regard to Dr. Gerald Hamm and
Mr. John Bender, did the School Board
violate the collective bargaining agreement by requiring their mandatory retirement at age 66 regardless of tenure,
fitness for employment and teaching
ability? If so what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the American Arbitration Association
in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania on January 24, 1979 at which time
representatives of the above named parties appeared and were
afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument.
The grievance is limited to the Board's mandatory retire
ment policy as implemented in 1976 and 1977.

That policy, which

ubstantively originated in 1967, was reiterated in 1976 by the
following Board resolution:
Resolved, that no ten month employee who has
reached the age of 66 years shall continue in
service beyond June 30 next succeeding his 66th
birthday and no 12 month employee shall continue
in service beyond August 31st next succeeding
his 66th birthday and, be it
Further Resolved, that the Superintendent of
Schools is authorized to continue in service
any employee beyond the age of 66 if in his
judgement this action is in the best interest
of the School District, provided that no
employee shall continue in service beyond

-2June 30 next succeeding his 68th birthday for 10 month employees, and August
31 next succeeding his 68th birthday for
12 month employees.
Pursuant thereto grievant Bender who reached his 66th
birthday in 1976 was involuntarily retired at the end of that
academic year.

Grievant Hamm, who also reached age 66 in 1976

was permitted to continue an additional year in accordanc e with
the second paragraph of the above Resolution, and was involuntarily
retired at the end of the academic year of 1977.

Bender's

petition to continue beyond 1976, and Hamm's petition to continue
beyond 1977 were denied by the Superintendent of Schools.
The Union contends that the mandatory retirement policy
of the Board as applied to the grievants in 1976 and 1977 was
violative of certain specified state and federal legislation and
was unconstitutional; and that violates the collective bargaining
agreement, particularly the "non-discrimination" and the "just
cause for discipline or discharge" clauses of the contract.
Alternatively, if the policy is found valid, the Union asserts
that it is "improper and unfair" within the meaning of a contract
grievance; that the Superintendent of Schools by selectively and
without regard to a Board memorandum entitled Guidelines For
Recommending Retention In Service Beyond Mandatory Retirement Age,
retired some teachers and permitted others to continue, exercised
his discretionary authority in an arbitrary and capricious manner
and "deviated and misapplied

policy", thereby invalidating

that policy.
Whether the policy, as implemented and applied to the
grievants in 1976 and 1977 violated state or federal legislation
and/or was unconstitutional

are not questions within the juris-

diction of the arbitration forum.
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The stipulated issue is limited to

whether

the policy violated the collective bargaining agreement, not
statutes, legislation or the constitution.

The legality of the

policy under law external to the collective bargaining

agreement

is exclusively for the forum with adjudicatory jurisdiction over
that question, namely the designated administrative agency and
the courts.

Any ruling by an arbitrator could not preempt the

decision making authority of those forums and therefore could be
neither authoritative nor determinative.
The contract admonition to the arbitrator that he may
not render an award "contrary to applicable law" means, in my
view, that once "applicable law" has been determined by the forum
with jurisdiction, whether that be an administrative agency, the
legislature, or the courts, the arbitrator is prohibited from
making a decision contrary to or in conflict therewith.

In the

instant case and based on the record before me, the "applicable
law" regarding the validity of the Board's policy on mandatory
retirement for the years 1976 and 1977 has not been fully or
finally determined by the courts.

Hence there is not yet a

settled determination to which the arbitrator would otherwise be
bound.

It follows then that with regard to the legality of the

Board's policy under legislation, statutes and the constitution
for the relevant years, the rights of the parties are fully reserved for whatever action may be available or pending in any othe
appropriate forum.
With regard to what is before me, I do not find the
Board's policy as applied to the grievants in 1976 and 1977 to be
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violative of the collective bargaining agreement.

The contract

covering those years is silent on the matter of mandatory retirement.

In the predecessor contract, covering the years 1972-1976,

the Union obtained a moratorium on or suspension of the policy.
The Union sought but failed to obtain a continuation of that
moratorium in the 1976-1978 contract.

By negotiating that

moratorium or suspension, rather than attacking its validity
under the contract, means to me that the Union accepted the
contract validity of the retirement policy, seeking only to
suspend its application for as long as possible.

When it failed

to continue the suspension for the contract years 1976-1978 that
ended the only contract limitation on the mandatory
policy.

retirement

And consequently the unchallenged validity and effective-

ness of the policy was reestablished.
I also construe the negotiated moratorium in the
predecessor contract as persuasive evidence that the Union did
not then think that the policy was violative of the "just cause
for discipline or discharge" provision of the contract.

For had

it thought so, it would have then, as it does now, attack the
policy on those grounds.

The fact is that the contract

clause

requiring just cause for discipline or discharge does not in my
judgement cover, nor did it contemplate involuntary retirement
because of age.
incompetence
dismissal.

That clause is intended to cover misconduct,

and other traditional grounds for discipline or
Involuntary retirement because of age is not "dis-

missal or discipline" within the intent or meaning of that
provision.

Hence I conclude, the Board promulgated

its policy
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on mandatory retirement to deal with a matter not covered by the
contract; and the Union negotiated a moratorium in the prior
years, as the only method of staying implementation of that policy
under the contract.
Moreover the "just cause" provision of the contract
referred to by the Union, is applicable to teachers (and other
employees) who do not have tenure.

The Union merely alleges, but

has not proved that with his retention for the year 1977 grievant
Hamm became non-tenured.

The Board disputes that assertion.

Therefore the record is devoid of evidence establishing the thresh
hold applicability of the "just cause" provision to grievant Hamm
( or to grievant Bender who undisputedly, was tenured at the time
of his involuntary retirement).
Nor does the policy violate the "nondiscrimination"clause
of the contract.

That language prohibits discrimination

on the

basis of "race, creed, color, national origin, sex or marital
status."

It says nothing about "age1.1

It seems to me that when

negotiated the question of "age" was well within the contemplation
of the parties.

By not including it, means to my mind, that as

lamentable as age discrimination may be it is not
prohibited by that clause.

contractually

Indeed, the fact that federal legis-

lation effective January 1, 1979 has now changed this Board's
and other employer mandatory retirement policies, indicates that
the traditional nondiscrimination clause limited as here to
circumstances

other than age was not applicable to and not enough

to bar rules requiring mandatory retirement at age 65, or as here
at age 66.

Of course this is not to say, nor is it to judge one
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way or the other, whether mandatory retirement because of age
would constitute "discrimination because of age" even if the
contract clause included an express prohibition against age
discrimination.
Finally, there are only allegations, but no probative
evidence before me, that the Superintendent of Schools "deviated
from" or "misapplied" the policy or that he failed to follow the
previously referred to "Guidelines", when he retained some
teachers beyond age 66 and forced the retirement of others.

No

evidence or testimony regarding the circumstances of: any teachers
other than the grievants was presented in this arbitration.

Hence

I do not know why some were retired and others retained, or even
who they were; and hence I cannot even make comparisons between
the grievants and others who also reached age 66 in the years
involved.

In short there is nothing before me of an adequate

evidentiary nature on which I could base a conclusion that the
decisions of the Superintendent of Schools under the second
paragraph of the Board's resolution were not made pursuant to
the Guidelines.
The only example offered by the Union is that grievant
Hamm was allowed to continue through 1977 because "a phone call
was made on his behalf", but not allowed to continue thereafter
even though the 'same phone call was again made on his behalf."
This sparse information is simply not enough to support a
conclusion that the Superintendent of Schools acted unfairly,
arbitrarily, or mis-applied the policy with regard to Dr. Hamm.

-7There may well have been reasons consistent with the Guidelines
and irrespective of the calls in either or both of the years, for
Dr. Hamm's retention after 1976 and his forced retirement in 1977.
In short, there simply is not probative evidence in the record
to support a charge of "unfairness

....deviation from or mis-

application of policy" or selective and/or arbitrary treatment
in the way the Superintendent applied the policy to the grievants
in the years 1976 and 1977.

And inasmuch as those allegations

are made by the Union, it is the Union's burden to support them
with the requisite quantum of evidence and proof.

The Union has

failed to do so herein.
For the foregoing reasons I do not find a breach of the
collective bargaining

agreement.

Though my Award will sustain the action of the Board,
the case manifestly

lends itself to a recommendation, a step

which arbitrators including this arbitrator take sparingly.

But

in view of the fact that the basic issue of mandatory retirement
has now been determined by federal legislation effective this
year, and as my Award upholds the Board's policy and its application to the grievants for the years 1976 and 1977, I should think
that the Superintendent of Schools is now in a position to consider
anew the petition of Dr. Hamm for reemployment and/or retention
on a year by year basis.

The Union has advised that grievant

Bender does not seek reemployment, so this recommendation does
not apply to him.

It is undisputed that Dr. Hamm is an excellent

teacher, in good health, in full command of his faculties, and
highly regarded by his colleagues and the students.

Under those

circumstances, in view of my Award upholding the Board's policy

-8and against the backdrop of the current, undisputed preemptive
federal law, I can see no prejudice to the Board or to the
prerogatives of the Superintendent
employment without back pay.

of Schools by Dr. Hamm's re-

Therefore I recommend that the Boarc

and the Superintendent of Schools so reemploy him.

If reemployed

his status would be a matter for determination by the Board unless the parties mutually agree on some other status.

Acceptance

of this recommendation is for the sole determination of the Board.
If not accepted, the Award as follows, obtains.
The Undersigned duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
With regard to Dr. Gerald Hamm and Mr. John
Bender, the School Board did not violate the
collective bargaining agreement by requiring
their mandatory retirement age age 66 regardless of tenure, fitness for employment and
teaching ability.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: February 3, 1979

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Philadelphia Federation of Teachers,
Local #3, AFT, AFL-CIO

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #14 30 0255 77 M/Q

and
Board of Education of the School
District of Philadelphia

The stipulated issues are:
1. Whether the School District violated
the collective bargaining agreement by
failing to remove three emotionally disturbed students from grievant's regular
classroom and permitting them to remain
in grievant's classroom, should the
grievant be compensated for such violation
in an amount equal to the salary differential paid to teachers of the emotionally
disturbed?
2. Where a Federation Building Committee
and a School District principal agree to
certain policies, practices and/or working conditions for a particular school
and such agreement is not in violation
of and/or inconsistent with the terms of
the Federation-School District collective
bargaining agreement, may a principal subsequently alter that agreement?
3. Has the School District violated its own
statement of past practice, policies and procedures concerning the elimination of athletic
programs by drastically reducing the intramural
program at Frankford High School in facor of the
instition of an interscholoastic wrestling program?
Did the elimination of intramural sports at
Frankford High School comply with the previous
rulings regarding the prohibition on the eliminination of sports activities solely on the basis
of student participation?

-2Did the principal comply with the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement requiring discussion with the building
committee prior to the institution of the
change in the intramural program?
A hearing was held in the offices of the American
Arbitration Association in Philadelphia on February 14, 1979
at which time representatives of the Federation and District
appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to

offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

A stenographic record was taken.

Issue No. 1
The District Hearing Officer at the step 2 hearing determined that three emotionally disturbed students were in the
regular elementary school class of Elementary School teacher
Joseph Pizzo; that the District refused to remove those children
and place them in a special education class for emotionally
disturbed children; and that the District thereby violated
Article TV 5b of the collective bargaining agreement.

Pursuant

to Article B-VIII step 4b and the ruling of this Arbitrator at
the hearing, those factual findings of the Hearing Officer are
not disputable in this arbitration because no evidence or testimony other than that presented at the step 2 hearing may be
introduced in the arbitration.
I find that the presence of emotionally disturbed children
in Mr. Pizzo's regular class constituted a de facto assignment
to Mr. Pizzo of duties properly within the higher rated job of
Special Education Teacher.
It is well accepted in the industrial setting, and I see

-3-

no reason why it should not apply here, that whether a contract
explicitly provides for it or not, the appropriate remedy in such
situations is for the employee assigned to higher rated duties
to receive the rate of pay of the higher job classification during the period he performs those duties.

This rule applies

whether the employee is officially placed in the higher classification or called upon to perform duties which properly fall within the higher job classification.

Under the contract, emotion-

ally disturbed children are to be placed in special classrooms
under the supervision of Special Education Teachers.

That should

have been done with the three students in Mr. Pizzo's class.
That it was not done, and for the period of time that they were
under Mr. Pizzo's supervision, Mr. Pizzo was called upon to
perform duties properly within the higher paid job of Special
Education Teacher.

Accordingly, for the period of time that the

three emotionally disturbed students were in Mr. Pizzo's class,
he shall be paid the differential between his regular rate of pay
and the higher rate of the Special Education Teacher classification in effect during the 1975-1976 school year.
Issue No. 2
The contract is silent on the beginning and ending hours
of the after school and evening educational programs of the
General Evening Division of the West Philadelphia High School.
Correspondingly, the contract is also silent on the hours of
work of the teachers assigned to that program.
Traditionally, in the absence of an explicit

contract

-4-

provision the starting and finishing times of a work day or
schedule are managerial prerogatives.

It is the length of the

work day or work schedule which is mandatorily bargainable.
In the instant case, and in the absence of a specific
contract provision covering the subject, I find that the undisputed agreement in 1973 between the then High School principal
and the Federation Building Committee to fix the teaching hours
from 6:45 PM to 9:45 PM

became a "polic(y) and procedure"

within the meaning of Article B-II Section 5a(ii) and 5b(i) of
the contract.

But any such agreement is not indefinitely binding

nor does it require mutual agreement to be changed.

The language

of B-II Section 5b(i) clearly contemplates and provides for
changes in policies and procedures.

It does not require that

changes be jointly agreed to, but rather that changes be the
subject of discussions. I interpret this to mean that so long
as there are preliminary and good faith discussions, the District
may thereafter make changes in policies and procedures even in
the absence of agreement with the Federation.
I find that good faith and meaningful discussions took
place between the parties prior to the change in hours to which
the Federation now objects.

Therefore the change by the school

principal in 1976 to teaching hours of 7:06 PM to 10:06

PM was

properly implemented, albeit without the consent of the Federatioiji
And as the hours of the after school/evening program, and the
teaching hours attendant thereto have not been included as express
provisions of the contract, that change, effectuated in 1976,
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obviously was not "inconsistent with the terms of Agreement."
Issue No. 3
I deem PFT-9, promulgated by the District, to be "policy
and procedure" of the District within the meaning of Article
BII 5b(i) of the contract.

Indeed the District recognized this

by the testimony in this proceeding of the Franklin High School
principal who asserted that the relevant provisions thereof were
duly considered and complied with in reaching the decision to
reduce or eliminate certain intramural athletic activities in
favor of a newly established wrestling program, with the resultant
layoff of one athletic teacher.
The District does not contend, as it did impliedly in
Issue No. 2, that it changed this policy following discussions
with the Federation,

but rather that its reduction or elimination

of intramural basketball, floor hockey, gymnastics and weight
training in favor of wrestling was in accordance with "practice
and policy."

I do not agree.

PFT-9, expressly provides standards

for the "elimination, reduction or substitution" of after school
athletic programs.

Here, by decision of the principal there was

the substitution of a new wrestling program and a reduction or
elimination of other athletic activities.

So Section 4A of the

aforementioned policy statement is applicable.
Based on the record I do not find that the "needs and
interests" of the pupils supported the substitution of wrestling
for basketball, weight training, floor hockey and gymnastics.
Several hundred students were active in the latter activities

-6and only seventy, then reduced to about thirty-six participated
in wrestling.

There is no showing of any special need or

compelling interest of the substantially smaller group which
would justify replacing the existing interests and needs of the
majority.

Moreover, there was no special or different budgetary

constraints requiring the elimination or reduction of the
original athletic program.
those activities as before.

Funds were available to continue
Of course there may have not been

enough money to add wrestling to the then existing program, but
I do not deem that a "budgetary constraint" within the meaning
of PFT-9 upon which the replacement of existing athletic
activities in favor of wrestling can be justified.
In my judgement the failure of the principal to comply
with these two standards constituted violations of District
policy, proscribed, in the absence of a change in that policy,
by Article B-II 5b(i) of the contract.
As to remedy the Arbitrator, mindful of the amount of time
that has elapsed since this grievance arose and because he is
not specially familiar with the administrative, scheduling,
hiring and retention practices of the District, is reluctant to
dictate to the District what athletic or recreational activities
should now obtain.

He believes that the instant contract viola-

tion can be best cured by a mutually negotiated agreement between
the Federation and the District, both of whom are better cognizant
of what would be necessary to reestablish a preexisting program
or change the present program.

Also, I am not persuaded that the

-7principal acted in bad faith.

I think he believed that there

was a genuine interest in wrestling which he wrongly estimated
beyond the actual enrollment and participation, and that the
student interest and need would be served.

Under that circum-

s tance I shall direct that the parties forthwith attempt to
jointly negotiate a remedy for and resolution of this issue.
If they fail to do so within thirty days from the date of this
Award, the matter shall be returned to me and I shall fashion and
award a remedy.

I retain jurisdiction for that purpose.

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD
1. The District violated the collective bargaining agreement by failing to remove three
emotionally disturbed students from the regular classroom of Mr. Joseph Pizzo and by permitting them to remain in that classroom.
For the period of time in which they were in
Mr. Pizzo's class, Mr. Pizzo shall be compensated in an amount equal to the salary
differential paid to teachers of the emotionally disturbed.
2. Under the circumstances involved, and following meaningful discussions with the Federation
Building Committee, the principal did not violate the contract when he changed the beginning
and ending teaching hours of those teachers
working in the after-school and evening program
of the West Philadelphia High School.
3. In response to the three parts of the stipulated
issue, the District and the principal violated
the collective bargaining agreement by failing
to follow existing policy with regard to the
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"elimination, reduction or substitution"
of the intramural athletic program at the
Frankford High School. The parties are
directed to forthwith attempt to negotiate
a jointly agreed to resolution of this
issue and an appropriate remedy„ If they fail
or are unable to do so within thirty days hereof, the matter shall be referred back to me
and I will fashion and award a remedy. For
that purpose I retain jurisdiction.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: June 24, 1979

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Local 369 Utility Workers Union
of America, AFL-CIO

AWARD

and
Boston Edison Company
The Undersigned duly designated as the Arbitrators, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties make the following AWARD:
The Company did not violate the collective
bargaining agreement by its deletion of
Paragraph 132 from General Order 101 at
the time of its reissuance in January 1975,
or by failing to consistently continue to
make work assignments in accordance with
Paragraph 132 thereafter.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

John J. Godfrey
Concurring

Donald E. Wightman
Dissenting
DATED:
STATE OF New York )gg .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this
day of May, 1979, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
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DATED:
STATE OF
COUNTY OF
On this
day of May, 1979, before me personally
came and appeared John J. Godfrey to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

DATED:
STATE OF
COUNTY OF
On this
day of May, 1979, before me personally
came and appeared Donald E. Wightman to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Local 369 Utility Workers Union
of America, AFL-CIO

OPINION OF CHAIRMAN

and
Boston Edison Company

In accordance with the arbitration provisions of the
collective bargaining agreement between Local 369, Utility
Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as
the "Union", and Boston Edison Company hereinafter referred to
as the "Company", the Undersigned was designated as the Chairman
of a tri-partite Board of Arbitration to hear and decide, together with the Union and Company designees to said Board, the
following stipulated issue:
Did the Company violate the collective
bargaining agreement by its deletion of
Paragraph 132 from General Order 101 at
the time of its reissuance in January,
1975, or by failing to consistently continue to make work assignments in accordance with Paragraph 132 thereafter? If so
what shall be the remedy if any?
Hearings were held on June 5 and October 4, 1978 at which
time representatives of the Union and Company appeared and were
afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses.

Messrs. Donald E. Wightman

and John J. Godfrey served respectively as the Union and Company
Arbitrators on the Board of Arbitration.

The Oath of the

Arbitrators was waived; a stenographic record was taken; the
parties filed post-hearing briefs; and the Board of Arbitration
met in executive session on April 4, 1979.
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Paragraph 132 which was in effect some sixteen years
until January 1975 required that:
Operation of Knife Blades or Application
of Leads in Stations
Whenever an operator is required to apply
leads, or perform prearranged switching
of hookstick operated indoor knife blades,
on equipment normally operated at 2300
volts or higher, other than street lighting circuit equipment, he must be accompanied
by a second person competent to check the
location and performance of the operation.
The second person must be informed of the
operating duties to be performed and after
checking the location, observe the operation
from a safe distance. The person accompanying
the operator may be another operator, a
supervisor, or in those cases where the operating duties are being performed in conjunction
with construction, maintenance or testing, a
competent employee of the division doing work
except when live transfer bus switching or
the application of phasing leads is involved.
In all cases the question of competence is
determined by supervisory personnel of the
operating division concerned. Switching to
isolate defective equipment, to prevent damage
or outage, and to restore service is a primary
function of operators and does not require a
second man.
Based on the record it is apparent that the mandate of
Paragraph 132 was intended for purposes of safety, efficiency and
to eliminate mistakes.
I conclude that General Order 101, with Paragraph 132
included therein, was an exercise by the Company of its Managemen
Rights under Article V of the contract "to assign, supervise or
direct all working forces

and generally to control and super

vise or direct all working forces

and generally to control

and supervise the Company's operations and to exercise the other

-3customary functions of management."

Hence, the use of two

persons to perform the work in question was not a "past practice"
for the sixteen years it obtained, but rather the implementation
of a managerial prerogative under a specific provision of the
contract.

Pertinent to the instant dispute, Article V goes on

to provide that:
"If the Local claims that the Company
has exercised any of the.0
foregoing rights in a capricious or arbitrary manner, such claims shall be
subject to the Grievance Procedure...
and Arbitration..."
Both sides recognize that the issue in this case turns
whether the Company's deletion of Paragraph 132 in January of
1975 and the resultant elimination of the use of a second person
when the operator performed the work in question, was "capricious
or arbitrary" within the meaning of the foregoing contract clause
In my judgement the experience and consequences of the
performances by an operator of the work in question without the
presence or backup assistance of a second person between January
1975 and the date of this arbitration is relevant to that issue.
The experience has been that though there have been some statistical differences between the pre and post-1975 periods, primaril
as to mistakes in performing the operation, there have been no
substantial or even significant differences when the overall
quantity of work is considered.

I find that in the important

area of safety, there are no significant distinctions.

During

the post-January, 1975 period the requirement that the operator
perform the work alone has not resulted in demonstrably increased

-4dangers.

The low if not negligible accident rate has not in-

creased and there has been no serious accident since the change
in General Order 101.

In sum, comparing the operational exper-

iences of the pre and post-January, 1975 periods, I cannot find
significant differences in terms of efficiency, mistakes, or
accidents between when the work was performed by an operator
with a second person accompanying him, or by the operator alone.
Under that circumstance, namely the absence of any
significant differences between the performance of the work in
question by an operator alone or by an operator accompanied by
a second person, I fail to see how the Company's

elimination

of the use of a second person by the deletion of Paragraph 132,
was arbitrary or capricious.

It seems to me that where the work

is performed substantially as well by one operator instead of
two, and with no demonstrable increase in hazards or incidents
of accident, the Company had the managerial right to make the
disputed operational change, and the elimination of the "second
person" cannot be judged as "without reason" or "factually insupportable . "
This is not to say that the continuation of the use of
a second person is not a prudent precaution which the Company
might wisely continue, but rather and only that the Company's
decision not to do so and its determination that the second
person was unnecessary, was not "arbitrary or capricious"

and

hence not a contract violation.

Dated: May 29, 1979

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Brentwood Teachers Association

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1739 0314 78

and
Brentwood Union Free School District

The stipulated issue is:
Whether the District was correct in requiring Kenneth Moss to pay his hospitalization, medical insurance and life insurance from July 1, 1979 to August 31, 1979
while he was on unpaid leave of absence?
If not what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the offices of the District on March
14, 1979 at which time representatives of the District and the
Association appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity

to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The dispute centers

on the length of the grievant's leave of absence during the 'school
year 1978/79." It is undisputed that while an employee is on an
unpaid leave of absence he pays his own hospitalization, medical
insurance and life insurance premiums during that leave.

At issue

here is whether the grievant's leave of absence was for twelve
or fourteen months.

If the latter, the District is correct in

requiring him to pay those premiums for the period July 1 through
August 31, 1979 (the thirteenth and fourteenth month).

If the

former, namely that the grievant's leave is of twelve months,
from July 1, 1978 through June 30, 1979, the District erred in
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requiring him to continue paying his own premiums for two additional months thereafter.
The only official documentation defining the grievant's
leave of absence is the letter to him dated May 5, 1978 from the
Superintendent of schools which reads in pertinent part:
"Please be advised that the Board of
Education at a meeting conducted on
May 4, 1978, approved your request
for a leave of absence for the 1978/79
school year."
Neither the aforementioned

letter nor the minutes of the

meeting of the Board referred to therein particularized the
length of the leave.
It is well settled that ordinary words in a contract should
be given their ordinary and customary meaning.

I know of no

customary situation where the word "year", whether it be a
calendar year, fiscal year, school year or work year, exceeds
twelve consecutive months.

A different interpretation must be

supported by explicit contract language or by an established
past practice.

I find neither here.

The contract does not define the length of the "school year."
It can be logically argued that the contract reference to "work
year" is synonymous with "school year."

Under Article 4B the

"work year" is defined as the period from "one day prior to the
first day that students are required to report at the opening
of school and will end on the last day that student attendance is
required

" That definition provides for a "work year" of

less than twelve months.

Nor is Article 15B, upon which the

-3District relies helpful to the District's position.

That section

requires inter alia that leaves of absence will expire "so as to
have the teacher returning at the beginning of the school year or
at the beginning of a semester,, . .. „ " In either event, whether
the grievant's leave of absence expired at the end of June or at
the end of August the requirements of that section would be met 0
His leave ended early enough so as to have him return by the beginning of the school year or by the next semester in September,

So

that clause is not determinative of whether the grievant's leave
of absence was of twelve or fourteen months duration.

Nor are

there any other more definitive definitions of the length of a
"school year" in any of the other contract sections cited by the
District„
The District relies on past practice.

It asserts that in other

situations involving leaves of absences comparable to the leave
granted the grievant, the period of time was from July 1 until
September 1 of the following year.

The District asserts that

that was what was intended in the grievant's case.

I am persuaded

that there has been such a past practice as applied to other
employees, but I do not find that practice applicable to the ins tant case.

The difference is explicit,,

In the case of the other

employees the notification of the approval of the leaves of absence
invariably set forth the period of time of the leave, with the beginning and ending dates„

In those instances the District, in

accordance with its discretionary authority, accorded those
employees leaves of absence extending for fourteen months from
July 1 through August 31st of the following year0

But those

-4employees were on explicit notice of the length of their leaves
because their letters of notification so stated.
case of the grievant.

Not so in the

His letter of notification is different.

It grants him a leave of absence "for the 1978/79 school year."
It does not particularize the length of the leave.

In that

significant respect the grievant's leave of absence is distinguished from, and hence not controlled by any different practice
involving other employees and other leaves of absence.
I note that the School District asserts that its letter inform^ing the grievant of the approval of his leave of absence was intended for other purposes as well as that notification.

And that

the other purposes may have been foremost in the mind of the Super
intendent of Schools.

Yet that letter stands as the only official

docutmentation of the nature and extent of the grievant's leave
of absence.

In the absence of more probative evidence, explicit

contract language or an applicable past practice to the contrary,
the District is bound to the wording of that letter and to its
normal, customary interpretation.
Accordingly the Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator
and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above
named parties makes the following AWARD:
The leave of absence of Kenneth Moss was
for the period July 1, 1978 through June
30, 1979.
Therefore the District was not
correct in requiring Mr. Moss to pay his
hospitalization, medical insurance and life
insurance for the period July 1 through
August 31, 1979.
The premiums for those
benefits are to be paid as provided by the
contract for an employee not on leave of
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absence during the period July 1
through August 31, 1979.

Eric J./Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: April 14, 1979
STATE OF New York )ss.
COUNTY OF New York )
On this fourteenth day of April, 1979 before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same»

lENORg !0k ;
Notary Public, State
r.'o. 41-7161:..
Ou-!1; ' :-d in Queen?
c-rr,,-'• ,~j* "-.mires Marcl-

PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD, ADMINISTRATOR

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Uniformed Firefighters of Cohoes
Local 2562

SUPPLEMENTAL AWARD
Case #A-78-ll

and
City of Cohoes

In letters dated February 3 and February 5, 1979, the
Union and the City have jointly submitted to me for decision two
issues related to or arising from my Interim Award of August 9,
1978 and my Award of September 18, 1978 in Case #A-78-ll.

As the parties well know, the aforementioned Interim Award
and Award were the product of mediated and/or negotiated settlements between the Union and the City.

Though well within the

contemplation of the parties at the time those settlements were
reached, neither mentioned nor provided for any back pay, overtime pay or other monetary damages for the period of time between
when the City should have provided EMT training and when, pursuant
to the Award, that training began.

Not having been so included,

I must conclude that the agreements did not contemplate any such
payments.

Therefore I may not and shall not read into or inter-

pret my Awards, which are only reflections of those agreements,
terms not included therein.

Accordingly the Union's claim for

some six months of monetary payments for "loss of overtime" due
to delays by the City in providing EMT training, is denied.

The second issue involves a claim by James Keefe for EMT
overtime which the Department denied him the opportunity to work
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during his scheduled vacation.
The relevant part of the Interim Award of August 9, 1978
reads:
Said overtime opportunities for EMT
firefighters shall be rotated to
afford each relatively equal amounts
of overtime. (Emphasis added)
While it is true that Mr. Keefe was apparently bypassed or
denied an opportunity to work his rotational EMT overtime which
fell during his vacation, I cannot conclude that the Department's
denial of his request that he be called in and permitted to work
that specific overtime, constituted, standing alone, a breach of
the foregoing provision of the Interim Award.

The Interim Award

does not require that the EMT overtime be apportioned precisely
equally among EMT firefighters.

Rather it only requires that it

be rotated to achieve relative equality.

Until a reasonable

measuring period has elapsed it would be impossible to determine
if that requirement has been met.

That Mr. Keefe missed an over-

time opportunity during his vacation does not mean that over a
period of six months (which I deem and herein rule to be a reasonable measuring period) he would not have been provided with other
additional EMT overtime to make up for that loss, so that his
standing as to quantity of overtime would be at a point relatively
equal to the other EMT firefighters.

If, after a six month period

Mr. Keefe's EMT overtime opportunities are not relatively equal to
the others, he would then have a right to grieve.

Also, for the same reasons, the Interim Award does not require that the EMT overtime opportunities be rotated unvarying in
turn to each EMT firefighter.

At times, for operational purposes,

-3emergencies, and as here, during vacations, a normal rotational
opportunity might be missed.

Standing alone that would not be a

violation of the Interim Award so long as over any six month period
the EMT overtime opportunities are adjusted and rotated so that
those opportunities are apportioned relatively equally among all
EMT firefighters.
Therefore the grievance of James Keefe is denied, with his
right reserved to grieve, if, after and over any consecutive six
month period his EMT overtime opportunities are or have not been
relatively equal to those of the other EMT firefighters.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: February
1979
STATE OF New York )gs .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this
day of February, 1979, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE, ADMINISTRATOR

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
American Flint Glass Workers Union,
AFL-CIO, Local Union 1000

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #78K16501

and
Corning Glass Works

In accordance with the arbitration provisions of the
collective bargaining agreement between the above named Union
and Company, the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator
to hear and decide the following stipulated issue:
Is the job of Mold Mechanic properly
evaluated with regard to the factors
Hazards, Surroundings and Responsibility
for Equipment and/or Tools?
A hearing was held at the Company plant in Corning, New
York, on December 12, 1978 at which time representatives of the
Union and Company appeared and were afforded full opportunity to
offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath

was waived and the parties

filed post-hearing briefs.
There is a threshold issue over whether the factor of
Responsibility for Equipment and/or Tools was processed through
the grievance procedure and is properly in arbitration in this
proceeding.

I am satisfied that there was constructive compliance

with the grievance procedure rendering that factor arbitrable in

-2this case.

The evidence shows that that factor was part of the

Union's original grievance; that it was to be discussed at a
grievance meeting; but that it was not discussed because that
meeting broke off and ended precipitously.
the Company had

I am satisfied that

adequate notice that that factor was contested;

that there is no element of surprise; and that the Company was
not prejudiced in dealing with that factor in this arbitration.
The parties are of course fully familiar with the job
evaluation plan applicable under the collective bargaining agreement, and with the method of using seventy "bench mark" jobs in
determining factor evaluations for other jobs, included that of
Mold Mechanic.

Hence I deem it unnecessary, except as particu-

larized herein, to recite those details.
Surroundings
For the factor of Surroundings the Company has used the
bench mark job of Clay Mixer and Weigher (BM13) with a point
score of 75 and in Degree IV.

That Degree defines surroundings

as :
"intermittent or continuous exposure to
very disagreeable surroundings as a
consequence of oil, grease, water, dust
and dirt."
The factor of Surroundings in the bench mark job is described as :
"Continuous exposure to very disagreeable
dust from raw materials and crushing
equipment."
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The Union claims that the proper bench mark job should be
Feeder Maintenance Mechanic Class A (BM70) with a point score of
110, at Degree V.

That Degree is defined as:

"Continuous exposure to very disagreeable
conditions such as extreme heat, noise
and glare."
In BM70 the factor of Surroundings is described as:
"Continuous and simultaneous exposure to
extreme dirt, grease and oil, heat, noise,
glare."
Based on the record I judge that the gravamen of this
dispute is over the question of whether the Mold Mechanic classification is continuously or only intermittently exposed to the
disagreeable conditions enumerated in the foregoing definitions
and descriptions.
I agree with the Union that a job and each of its factors
are to be evaluated by considering the totality of the duties of
the classification, not the particular duties to which one or a
group of employees so classified may be assigned either exclusive
ly or substantially.
fails.

On that basis however, the Union's complaint

The record establishes that a substantial part of the

Mold Mechanic's

responsibilities and duties are carried out in

the upstairs "Mold Room", the "surroundings" of which are undisputedly pleasant, and in my view well within Degree IV.
is clear that

It

some of the duties of the Mold Mechanic, speci-

fically "hot jobs", located primarily "downstairs" and various

-4aspects of mold cleaning "upstairs" unquestionably involve very
disagreeable exposures continuously and simultaneously when
those jobs are performed.

But, the Mold Mechanic's classifica-

tion is not confirned to those "hot jobs"

or mold cleaning and

inasmuch as that type of work is quantitatively a small portion
of the totality of duties which are or may be required of a
Mold Mechanic, it cannot be said that the Mold Mechanic classification as an overall entity, carries with it or involves
exposure to extreme dirt, grease and oil, heat, noise, glare,
water or dust on a continuous and simultaneous basis.

Rather,

with proper consideration to the mix of the total duties in the
mold rooms and on hot jobs, the

"Surroundings" in which the

Mold Mechanic classification works is "very disagreeable"
intermittently, as that factor is presently evaluated.

Therefore

the Union's claim for an increase in the point evaluation of
the factor Surroundings from 75 points to 110 points and from
Degree IV to Degree V, is denied.
Hazards
The Company has evaluated the factor of Hazards in Degree
II at 55 points, using the bench mark job of Tool Maker (BM63).
This Degree defines Hazards as:
"Frequent exposure with moderate cuts,
bruises, strains or burns possibly
resulting."
The bench mark job of Tool Maker defines Hazards as:

-5"Frequent exposure to moderate injuries
such as: strains from lifting heavy
castings; cuts from machine tools."
The Union claims that the factor of Hazards for the Mold
Mechanic should be at Degree III with 80 points, and that the
proper bench mark job is Feeder Maintenance Mechanic Class A
(BM70).

The Degree III definition is:
"Frequent exposure with possible lost
time injury resulting from sprains,
severe strains, fractures, burns, severe
cuts or heat exhaustion."

The BM70 description for Hazards is:
"Frequent exposure to lost time injuries
such as:severe sprains when lifting and
carrying repair parts, severe cuts and
burns and fractures when repairing moving machinery."
So far as the Hazards applicable to the Mold Mechanic job
is concerned, the dispute centers on whether a possible injury
would or would not result in "lost time."
Without delineating the large number of jobs required of
the Mold Mechanic classification, especially those characterized
as "hot" jobs, and those both upstairs and downstairs which involve use of and proximity to chemicals and fumes that are caustic
and carcinogenic

(for which the Company wisely requires and per-

forms regular medical examinations of the employees), I am
persuaded that even where an employee is not negligent and with
due regard for the presence of safety devices on the equipment
and as part of the methods, there is the realistic potential for
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injuries which would result in "lost time."

In evaluating

Hazards I am persuaded that any time a Mold Mechanic is or may
be required to perform some of the various "hot" jobs and
certain tasks relating to the cleaning of molds, regardless of
how frequent or infrequent any such assignment may be, there is
a present risk of potential injury which carries with it a
reasonably likelihood of "lost time."

That the Degree II does

not include credit for the possibility of a "lost time" injury,
means that insufficient credit has been accorded that reasonable
possibility.

Indeed, the Mold Mechanic job description, under

the factor of Hazards, recites:
"Frequent exposure to possible lost time
injuries
" (emphasis added).
I conclude that the foregoing definition set forth in the
job description is a more accurate description of the type of
injuries that may take place.

And inasmuch as those injuries

may possibly result in lost time, the factor of Hazards should
be increased from Degree II to Degree III and from 55 points to
80 points.
Responsibility for Equipment and/or Tools
There is no dispute that the Company has selected the prope
bench mark job, i.e. Operator and Set-Up-Bryant Grinder (BM43).
That bench mark job accords 115 points and Degree II to the
factor Responsibility for Equipment and/or Tools, and that point
credit, to that extent, is not disputed.

However the Union
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contends that because that bench mark job has been utilized, the
Company is required, automatically, to add an additional 25
points as provided by the "Special Investment Allowance"
accorded that bench mark classification.

The Union's assertion

is not supported by the Evaluation Manual, Guide For Describing
and Evaluating.

Under Responsibility For Equipment and/or Tools

the Manual directs as follows:
Determine points for Normal Base Allowance
by comparison with bench marks shown in the
following Guide Chart, without, regard to
investment level (emphasis added).
That language, together with an examination of the Guide
Chart, persuades me that there is an evaluative independence between the basic determination of the degree and point score for
that factor, and a determination of any additional credit for a
special investment allowance. In other words the latter, namely
the special investment allowance is not an inextricable or automatic part of the measurement of the degree and points to be
accorded

the factor of Responsibility For Equipment and/or Tools

when utilizing the BM43 job.

I am persuaded that the method of

reaching the evaluation is to first establish the Normal Base
Allowance.

This the Company did when it gave this factor for

the Mold Mechanic job, 115 points and Degree II.

Thereafter, a

decision is made as to whether a special investment allowance
is to be added and that is based on whether the job "use(s)
equipment and tools in which the Company has a larger than usual

-8investment."

In making that second or subsequent determination

the instruction manual provides:
"Two special levels, High and Major Investment, have been set up in the chart and the
points obtained are added to those previously
determined under the Normal Base Allowance."
The foregoing means to me that a special investment
allowance is added only when the job utilizes equipment and
tools

in which the Company has a larger than usual investment,

and that the number of additional points will be either 10 or
25 depending on whether the investment is High or Major.

That

bench mark job 43 has been accorded a special investment allowance of 25 points is based on this latter consideration, and
therefore it is not automatically or mandatorily applicable to
the job of Mold Mechanic.

Hence the Union's claim that an

additional 25 points must automatically attach to the point
score accorded that factor in the mold mechanic evaluation is
unsupported by the applicable job evaluation system.

The Union's

claim is denied.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD
The job of Mold Mechanic is properly
evaluated with regard to the factors
of Surroundings and Responsibility
For Equipment and/or Tools.
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It is not properly evaluated with regard to the factor of Hazards. That
factor shall be increased to Degree
III and raised to 80 points.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: May 30, 1979
STATE OF New York )ss. :
COUNTY OF New York )
On this thirtieth day of May, 1979, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Bakery Drivers Local Union #5550

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1330 0243 79

and
Drake

Bakeries, Div. of Borden, Inc.

The stipulated issue is:
Was the two-day suspension of Fred Pesce
violative of the collective bargaining
agreement? If so what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on August 20, 1979 at which time Mr.
Pesce, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of the above named Union and Company appeared. All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

Post-hear-

ing memoranda were filed.
Based on the evidence adduced and fundamental principles
of tort law I must conclude that the vehicular accident resulting in the grievant's disciplinary suspension, was the grievant's
fault.

That negligence, albeit non-willful, would, standing

alone, warrant discipline, and I would not consider a two-day
suspension to be unreasonable.
However, in addition to disputing the grievant's liability
for the accident, the Union asserts that the disciplinary suspension imposed was disproportionately severe as compared to
no discipline or only reprimands issued in cases of other
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employee/drivers who were responsible for vehicular accidents
in the course of their employment with the Company.

And more

particularly, that unlike the grievant, no other employee was
disciplined for "a first accident."
It is well settled that to be upheld, even if for just
cause, disciplinary penalties must be consistently, uniformly
and even handedly applied to all offending employees similarly
situated.
On the other hand, though arguably beyond an employee's
control, the extent of material damage or monetary loss once
causal negligence has been established, are valid distinctions
for differing disciplinary penalties.
In the instant case therefore, the issue narrows to whether
the grievant (and the accident for which he was responsible) is
similarly situated to other employees/ drivers who were involved
in accidents and who either were not disciplined or who received
reprimands.

If so, regardless of the moderate nature of the two

day suspension, that penalty, disproportionately more severe,
could not be upheld.
The proofs on both sides of this critical question are uncertain and of inadequate probative value.

The Company has merely

alleged the amount of damages and costs sustained by the instant
accident.

Indeed, I do not accept the Company's proffered

figures or calculations because they are unsubstantiated by bills
receipts, proof of payment and other requisite documentation,
and they do not take into consideration offsets from insurance
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reimbursement and the use of undamaged or reclaimable parts from
the grievant's truck as spare parts for other Company vehicles.
In short neither the gross amounts of the alleged damages and/or
costs nor the net amounts after consideration of those offsets
have been proved in this record.
Similarly and conversely the evidence adduced by both sides
on the severity, amount of damage and/or liability arising from
other accidents of other employees, including those where driver
or passenger injury is alleged and where one or more employees
have been involved in multiple accidents for which, again alleged
they were at fault, is hearsay, contradictory, undocumented and
of inadequate probative value to make critical comparison between
the grievant's accident and those of other employees.

Not one of

the employees involved in those accidents testified, nor was any
first-hand documentation of the consequences of those accidents
presented by either side.
It is undisputed however that in those earlier accidents by
other employees, the Company imposed either no disciplinary
penalty or at most a reprimand.
As a disciplinary case the burden is on the Company to show
that its discipline has been evenly and uniformly applied in
similar situations.

More particularly here, the Company has the

burden of establishing a significant distinction between the
grievant's accident and those of others, to support its different
levels of penalty.

Based on the inadequate evidentiary record

before me I cannot find that the Company has met that burden.
No doubt, the Company suffered significant damage and costs

-4resulting from an apparent "total" loss of the grievant's truck,
from the destruction of the product therein, from payments to
the owner of the tractor-trailer which was struck and possibly
from an increase or probable increase in its workmens compensation experience rate.

But I am unable to conclude, and the

Company has not shown by probative evidence the extent of those
damages and losses ,

that they were significantly more costly

and extensive than other individual or cumulative accidents of
other employees.

Nor has the Company shown that the other

accidents were not the fault of Company drivers.
Accordingly I find no evidentiary basis to support a greater
disciplinary penalty for the grievant than what the Company imposed on other driver/employees in other, earlier accidents.
However some penalty is warranted consistent with what was given
others.

I deem a reprimand to be proper and appropriate.

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, having
been duly sworn and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the above named parties makes the following AWARD:
The two-day suspension of Fred Pesce is reduced to a reprimand. He shall be made whole
for the time lost.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: October 16, 1979
STATE OF New York )ss:<
COUNTY OF New York )
On this sixteenth day of October, 1979, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
United Steelworkers of America

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #14 30 1252 78 Q

and
Empire Steel Castings, Inc.

The stipulated issues are:
1. Did the Company violate the contract when
it deducted monies from Ronald Beissel's
pay check? If so what shall be the remedy?
2. Did the Company violate the contract when
it assigned Richard Miller to another shell
core machine on June 16, 1978? If so what
shall be the remedy?
3. Did the company violate Article V Section
3 when it did not include in the 1978 vacation pay the wage increase on top of the
average hourly earnings as recorded in the
first Social Security quarter of the calendar year? If so what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held in Reading, Pennsylvania on February 28,
1979 at which time representatives of the above named Union and
Company appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer
evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
Issue No. 1
From April 4 to June 16, 1978 Mr. Beissel, hereinafter referred
to as the "grievant", worked on an incentive job as a one man
operation.

The incentive rate for a one man operation was 2.03.

If the operation is run with two men the rate is 3.01.

By error,

the grievant was paid at the 3.01 rate for the period involved.
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and thereby earned more than he was entitled to.

As a consequence

the Company recouped the extra payment from the grievant's pay
over a period of time.

By the time of this hearing full recoup-

ment had been achieved.
The Union contends that the Company may only correct the
error prospectively, but that it has no right to retroactively
adjust the rate or retroactively deduct the overpayment.
not agree.

I do

This is a classical case of J'unjust enrichment."

I

make no finding that the grievant acted dishonestly, but rather
that he worked under an erroneous rate as a result of the Company's
clerical error.

Whether he knew it or not his earnings exceeded

what they should have been and were unrelated to his productivity
The Company's right to "change

a clerical error or an error

in computation" as provided by Article XX paragraph 5c carries
with it, in my judgement, the right to correct retroactively as
'
well as prospectively.
part.

This was a clerical error on the Company's

It provided the grievant with production sheets applicable

to a two man operation at a time that he was to perform the work
alone.
Accordingly the Company did not violate
the contract when it deducted monies
from Ronald Beissel's pay check.
Issue No. 2
The Union charges a violation of Article III Section 3 of
the contract.

That Section provides in pertinent part:

When an employee is transferred from his
regular job to another job while his job
is working, if for the convenience of the
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Company, he shall be paid at either his
regular rate, average rate, rate covering the job or incentive rate, whichever
is higher
When a temporary transfer is required
within a classification, the Company will
transfer the junior employee within that
classification on that shift
The dispute narrows to whether the two different shell core
machines are "different jobs" within the meaning of the foregoing
contract clause.
Richard Miller, the grievant, was transferred, for the convenience of the Company from the shell core machine which he
regularly operated to a different shell core machine which was
regularly operated by a Mr. Bubbenmoyer.

The grievant was neithe:

the junior employee within his classification on the same shift
nor was he paid average earnings for the period of time of that
assignment.

The Company contends this was not a transfer from

one job to another but merely a change in assignment within the
same job and within the same classification.

The Company

characterizes it simply as a shift in work stations, but not a
change in job, or work duties.
The foregoing contract clause refers to both "jobs" and
"classification0"

I am not persuaded that they are synonymous.

As they are sequentially bound together, those sections, read together, must mean that a classification can be made up of one
or more jobs.

And that transfers between and among different

jobs within a classification must follow the prescriptions of
that section, if the transfer is for the convenience of the

-4Company.

That the grievant was moved from the shell core machine

on which he regularly works to another shell core machine would
in my opinion be a shift from one job to another within the same
classification if there was some significant difference in the
operation, the methods, and hence the earning capacities of or
potential

on the two machines.

If not I would agree with the

Company that it was nothing more than a change in "work stations.
Obviously the purpose

of the foregoing contract language is to

protect the earnings of an employee when, for the convenience of
the Company, he is transferred from his regular job with which
he is familiar to a different job with which he is less familiar
and where his earnings might suffer.

Under that circumstance it

is only fair and proper, as the contract provides, that he be
guaranteed at least his average earnings.

In the instant case

the evidence adduced indicates that there was a sufficiently
significant difference between the two shell core machines in
question.
Testimony indicates that the machines operate somewhat
differently and that one is an older version of the other.

The

buttons and reset procedures are different as well as some other
mechanical aspects.

The point is that the grievant was not as

familiar with the machine to which he was assigned as he was with
his regular machine, and was unable to achieve the level of
earnings he would have earned
machine.

had he remained on his regular

I am persuaded that the foregoing contract section was

intended to protect against that circumstance particularly, where
as here, the transfer was for the convenience of the Company and
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at a time when the grievant's regular machine was in operation.
I also find that under that circumstance the Company had the
obligation to transfer not the grievant but an employee with
less seniority on the same shift.
Accordingly the Company violated the contract when it assigned Richard Miller to
another shell core machine on June 16, 1978.
He shall be made whole for the difference
between what he was paid and his average
earnings on his regular machine for the period
of time involved.
Issue No. 3
This issue requires the application and interpretation of
Article V Section 3 of the contract for the limited period March
9 through March 31, 1978.
On March 9, 1978, during the "first Social Security quarter
of the calendar

year" the contract wage increase went into effec

As a consequence, for the balance of that quarter, the Company
made an appropriate increase in the rates of the incentive jobs,
so as to reflect the general wage increase in the potential incentive earnings of the employees on incentive operations„

In

calculating vacation pay for the year 1978 the Company included
the average hourly earnings generated by the increased incentive
rate, but did not add thereto the general hourly wage increase
effective March 9.
The Union claims that the rate of pay for vacation, based on
the earnings reported in the first Social Security quarter of
the calendar year must contain two components; first all the
earnings gained from incentive and second the general hourly wage
increase "on top."
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The Company asserts that the Union's interpretation would
accord incentive employees a double wage increase and consequently the benefit of the wage increase in excess of 100 per
cent.

It reasons that for the employees to receive vacation

pay based on increased incentive earnings generated by the increased incentive rates related to the wage increase and to then
again be credited with the hourly wage increase "on top" is to
give them an increase in pay for purposes of vacation for the
period of March 9 through March 31, 1978 that exceeds the total
wage increase and the total vacation credit accorded non-incentive
employees.

The Company reasons that only the incentive rate

adjustment related to the wage increase for the period March 9
through March 31, 1978 should be credited to the rate for vacation pay, and that if the hourly wage increase is to be added,
it should be added after March 31st.
As the parties well know the Arbitrator is bound to the explicit terms of the contract even if the result is inequitable.
Any such inequities are only a reflection of the contract bargain entered into by the negotiators.

Article V Section 3 (para-

graph 1) reads:
The rate of pay for vacation hours shall
be his or her average hourly earnings as
reported in the first social security
quarter of the calendar year. Average rate
is all monies earned (including shift differential) divided by the number of hours worked,
in the proceeding quarter, plus all wage increases
added on top.
I find it to be sufficiently clear.

The formula in determining

average hourly earnings for the first Social Security quarter of
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the calendar year is made up of two parts.

The first is all

monies earned, including shift differential divided by the number
of hours worked in the preceeding quarter.
wage increases."
vacation.

The second is "all

That formula fixes the hourly rate of pay for

(The second paragraph of Section 3 which is not in

dispute herein sets forth the number of hours of pay at that rat
for the vacation entitlement.)
Applied to the instant dispute the monies earned by the incentive employees, or in other words the first part of the
formula, included their earnings resulting from the increased
incentive rates related to the wage increase for the period of
March 9 through March 31.

If, as the Company asserts, that is

the full extent of their earnings for calculation of a rate of
pay for vacation hours, the last part of the first paragraph of
Section 3, "plus all wage increases added on top" and the second
part of the formula

would be meaningless and unnecessary.

I

am not prepared to conclude that the parties negotiated that addi
tional language for a meaningless purpose.
Also, based on the testimony, I am not prepared to conclude
that the general wage increase effective March 9, 1978 was subsumed within the increased incentive rates for the period March
9 through March 31, 1978 for purposes of calculating the rate of
pay for vacation hours under Section 3 Article V.

The Union

officials testified that they negotiated that contract language
especially to give incentive workers additional money (in excess
of what non-incentive employees gained from the wage increase),

-8because in prior years the incentive workers "had not fully
benefited from general wage increases/1

The Union witness stated

that not only was that their intent but that at the conclusion
of contract negotiations they specifically asked the management
negotiators "if they knew what they were agreeing to."

It is

the Union's contention that "what they were agreeing to" was a
rate of pay for vacation hours for incentive employees exactly
as claimed by the Union in this arbitration.
Under that circumstance it seems to me that the burden then
and now is on the Company to show that that was not what was
agreed to by providing some other probative explanation of the
meaning of the contract language.

The Company did not and has

not done so to my satisfaction.
Accordingly the Company violated Article V
Section 3 when it did not include in the
1978 vacation pay the wage increase on top
of the average hourly earnings as reported
in the first Social Security quarter of the
calendar year. The Company is directed to
do so and to make appropriate adjustments in
the 1978 vacation pay of the affected employees.

DATED: April 16, 1979
STATE OF New York )ss. :
COUNTY OF New York )

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

On this sixteenth day of April, 1979 before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Republic Lodge 1987, IAMAW, AFL-CIO

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1330 1139 78

and
Fairchild Republic Company

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharges
of A. Korton and A. Shaw? If no what
shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on January 15, 1979 in Plainview, New
York, at which time Messrs. Korton and Shaw, hereinafter referred
to as the "grievants", and representatives of the above named
Union and Company appeared.

All concerned were afforded full

opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cros
examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

At the

conclusion of the hearing, at the request of the parties, and
accompanied by the grievants and representatives of the parties,
the Arbitrator made a plant visition to and observed the location
involved in the dispute.
Based on the entire record before me I conclude that the
Company has met its burden of establishing, for disciplinary
purposes, that the grievants were playing dice for money, in the
plant, in violation of rule 5c (Causes for Immediate Release) of
the Company's Disciplinary Standards Policy.

As the propriety of

those rules is not challenged by the Union in this procedure, and
inasmuch as a violation of rule 5c which prohibits "gambling",
calls for the termination of the offending employee, I have no

-2choice but to sustain the Company's action in discharging the
grievants.
More specifically, I find the testimony of the Company
witnesses, who first observed the grievants from outside the plant
through a hole in an entrance door, and then entered the plant
and confronted them, to be accurate and credible.

I find no

reason why those security officials would falsify their testimony.
:From my observation at the location, through the hole in the door,
I conclude that the Company security officials could and did see
the grievants throwing dice, and did see money present in their
hands and/or on the bench.

I conclude that the dice found by the

security personnel at the location, was the dice used in the game.
By contrast the testimony of the grievants was unpersuasive
and equivocal.

By example, at the hearing they denied that they

had any money out.

Yet, the credible testimony discloses that at

the grievance meetings, they had asserted that they had money in
their hands which they were counting for use later that morning
when they planned to go "bar hopping."

This marked

inconsistency

casts serious doubt on the veracity of their entire story and on
their denial of the gambling charge.
There is evidence that the Company security officer either
offered or led one of the grievants to believe that his discharge
would be reversed and he would receive a money payment if he
"cooperated" and disclosed the identity of others in the plant who
gambled or engaged in other prohibited activity.

The offer or what

may have appeared to be an offer was not accepted.
I interpret this to have been extra-contractual negotiation

-3which was not consummated.

On that basis, and under that particular

circumstance I am not prepared to find that the Company compromis
or waived the enforceability of rule 5c.

And it is not my role

or within my jurisdiction to pass judgement on what the Company
security officer termed a "plea bargaining" effort, particularly
when, as here, it did not involve the Union as the certified
bargaining agent, and did not reach a point of agreement.
With the foregoing decision, the Arbitrator wishes to make
a recommendation.

Undisputedly, the dice game in which the

grievants were engaged, was not the "big game" which the Company
was told was underway involving upwards of sixteen employees.

It

was not the "big game" that the Company sought to discover, and
for which in military "invasion" fashion, the Company organized
and directed into the plant, four teams of security personnel, to
surprise and apprehend the players.
Also, it is conceeded that though the grievants are of
short service with the Company in their present jobs, they both
were employees for some time previously of an independent guard
service assigned to the Company, and that they were good employees
in that capacity.
There is no evidence that they have had any prior disciplinary
offenses or penalties, either with the Company or with the security
service.
Accordingly, I think that a suspension, rather than discharge would be an adequate penalty under those particular
circumstances.

That is not my Award, because to so award would

be inconsistent with the Company's unchallenged work rules and

-4hence beyond the arbitrator's authority.

However, inasmuch as

mitigation is for the Company, and now that the Company's right
to discharge for gambling and the effectiveness and propriety of
rule 5c have been upheld, the Company may be willing without
prejudice to the foregoing right and rule, to reduce the penalty
of discharge to a suspension and reinstate the grievants without
back pay.

It should be clear that acceptance of this recommend-

ation is within the sole discretion of the Company.

If it rejects

the recommendation the Award as set forth below stands.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
There was just cause for the discharges
of A. Korton and A. Shaw.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: January 22, 1979
STATE OF New York )
. 00 •
COUNTY OF New York )
On this 22nd day of January, 1979, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
United Steel Workers of America
AFL-CIO, & Local Perth Amboy Smelter
And Refinery Workers Union #365

OPINION

AND

AWARD

and

Federated Metals Company

The stipulated issue is:
Is the claim for security and severance
pay arbitrable? If so, did Federated
Metals Company violate the security and
severance provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement by failing to pay
said security and severance to employees
eligible? If so, to what are those employees
entitled?
A hearing was held on October 30, 1978 at the offices of the
New Jersey State Board of Mediation in Newark, New Jersey at
which time representatives of United Steelworkers

of America,

Perth Amboy Smelter and Refinery Workers' Union No. 365, AFL-CIO
hereinafter referred to as the "Union" and Federated Metals
Company, hereinafter referred to as "Federated", appeared.

All

concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The

A stenographic record was taken

and post-hearing briefs were filed.
I do not find the facts and relevant contract clauses of the
instant case significantly distinguishable from Nolde Bros., Inc
v. Local No. 358 Bakery Workers, 430 U.S. 243, 94 LRRN 2753
(1977).

Despite any private reservations about the majority

decision in Nolde, as a decision of the United States Supreme
Court on the matter of arbitrability, I am bound to its holding
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and may not under similar facts and law substitute my judgement
for that of the Court.
The "distinction" upon which Federated relies - namely that
in the instant case unlike Nolde the arbitration forum is one
of several contractually named and rotationally appointed
arbitrators whose term of office ends with the expiration of
the contract - does not, standing alone, constitute within the
meaning of Nolde an express or clearly implied intent to exclude
from arbitration contract disputes arising after termination
of the agreement.

Absent explicit language to the contrary,

the bare use of named arbitrators cannot be construed as terminating the obligation to arbitrate after the end of the contract any more than if the contract provided for the appointment
of the arbitrator by an agency or by some other ad hoc means.
The fact is that if under Nolde, a dispute under the contract
remains arbitrable even if it arises after the contract
expiration, the forum for arbitration, as set forth in the
contract must perforce maintain its vitality and effectiveness
in order to ensure the implementation of the right to
arbitrate.

And that is so, absent explicit language or a clear

intent to exclude such disputes from arbitration whether the
arbitration forum be ad hoc appointments, a permanent umpire,
or as here a rotating panel.
Consequently, irrespective of any personal reservations I
may have about the majority decision in Nolde, I find it
applicable to the dispute before me, rendering that dispute
arbitrable.

-3-

The issue involves the application and interpretation of
Article XV (Security and Severance Plan), the pertinent part
of which reads:
PAYMENTS:
Laid-off employees (for lack of work only):
This arbitrator is mindful

of and has researched themany

arbitration decisions dealing with plant closings.

The question

of whether plant closings cause a "lay-off because of a lack
of work" of those workers whose jobs end with the plant closing
is hardly well settled.

Citing one of my own AWARDS, I ruled

in Brewery Workers Joint Local Executive Board of New Jersey
and Locals 843, 153 and 4, IBT and - P. Ballantine & Sons, and
Balco, Inc. (June 14, 1972) that the permanent shutdown of the
Ballantine plant in New Jersey and the sale of its assets to
the Falstaff Brewing Company constituted a 'layoff" of the
affected employees under a relevant contract provision, requiring
continuation of welfare payments for a stated period following
the cessation of operations.
On the other hand, in the instant case Federated did not
close down its operations under circumstances unrelated to the
Union, but rather closed, in part at least, for lawful economic
reasons while confronted with an on-going lawful strike by the
Union and its members.

It can be argued that in Ballantine

the employer was in complete control over whether he made work
available or not to the employees who were at work, and that the
cessation of operations was a unilateral managerial act that
created a "lack of work" beyond the employees fault or control.
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By contrast, in the instant matter, the employees were not at
work, presumably would not have accepted work even if made
available unless a new contract with acceptable terms had been
agreed upon and hence may be deemed to have contributed to or
shared in some of the responsibility for the plant closing.
However, as the strike and plant closing in the instant
matter were both apparently lawful economic actions, I conclude
that it would be wrong if in this proceeding either side gained
a benefit or suffered some prejudice by those actions.

Hence

I shall not deem them determinative or even probative.
To my mind what is significant is that under the same
contract and same contract provision, Federated's parent,
ASARCO some months earlier closed a large portion of its
operation at this location, and made security and severance payments under Article XV of the contract to its employees whose
jobs ended and who were not retained in employment for certain
continuing operations by Federated.

Because I do not find any

significant difference between the plant closing of ASARCO and
the later cessation of operations by Federated, I judge the
application of Article XV of the contract by ASARCO to have a
precedential effect on the closing of its subsidiary, Federated.
I conclude both closed down essentially for economic reasons;
that the employees of both lost their jobs under similar
conditions and that how ASARCO, under Article XV treated those
employees whose jobs ended is, both contractually and equitably
the way Federated, who undisputedly assumed ASARCO's collective
bargaining agreement with the Union covering the instant affected

-5employees who continued in employment from ASARCO to Federated,
should have treated its employees when it closed.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
The claim for security and severance pay
is arbitrable.

Federated Metals Company violated the
security and severance provisions of
the collective bargaining agreement by
failing to pay said security and severance to employees eligible. It shall
make such payments to eligible employees
in accordance with Article XV of the
collective bargaining agreement.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: March 6, 1979
STATE OF New York ),
COUNTY OF New York )'
On this sixth day of March, 1979 before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Metal Trades Council of New
London County, AFL-CIO

OPINION

and

and
General Dynamics Corporation
Electric Boat Division

AWARD
Case #MTC-1460A-8

In accordance with the arbitration provisions of the
applicable collective bargaining agreement between the above
named Union and Company, and pursuant to a stipulation entered
into in connection with a Federal court proceeding (more particularly referred to below), the Undersigned was selected as the
Arbitrator to hear and decide a dispute over the discharge of
Lucille Crandall Jones.
Six hearings were held over the period from October 12, 1978
through January 22, 1979 at which time Mrs. Jones (hereinafter
referred to as "Jones"); representatives of Jones and representatives of the Union and Company appeared.

All concerned were

afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses.

An extensive stenographic

record of the hearings was taken; a large number of exhibits were
introduced into evidence and both sides filed comprehensive posthearing briefs.

With the agreement of the Union Jones was

actively represented throughout these proceedings by the
Connecticut Women's Educational and Legal Fund, Inc. (by Phyllis
Gelman, Esq. and Susan R. Meredith, Esq.).

The Company was repre-

sented throughout by the law firms of Foley, Hoag and Eliot (by
Henry M. Kelleher, Esq. and Scott Moriearty, E'sq. ) and Robinson,
Robinson & Cole (by John F. Murphy, Esq.).
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The Company discharged Jones on March 1, 1978.
she was discharged without just cause.

She claims

She claims further that

the discharge was wholly or partially an act of retaliation against her for having made claims against the Company in a
federal suit and with federal and state administrative agencies
in which she alleged the Company had violated federal laws against sex

discrimination.

The Company denies its conduct in

any way was the product of retaliatory motices, and it claims
the discharge was for just cause.
I. Background
Jones began her employment with the Company on October 15,
1973 and became a Painter/Cleaner in the Paint Department on
November 18, 1973.

Along with all the Painter/Cleaners

in that

Department she was terminated for lack of work on January 10,
1975.

Of the 61 workers laid off, 49 were women.

Aware of the

impact of these layoffs on women, the Company's affirmative
action office reported it to the Maritime Administration of the
Department of Commerce, the agency charged with overseeing the
Company's compliance with the anti-discrimination

laws.

By

letter dated January 17, 1975, Jones filed a complaint with that
agency.
month.

The Company received notice of the complaint the same
Upon investigation the Maritime Administration found no

apparent sex discrimination practices in those layoffs.
In an attempt to lessen the effects of the layoffs on women,
the Company sought to place the laid off workers in other jobs
or training programs.

Jones was offered or considered for three

positions which she either did not want or for which she was not

-3qualified.

Ultimately she was rehired on January 12, 1975 as a

probationary employee in the Bindery.

She was discharged on

February 14, 1975 before the expiration of the 60 day probationary
period.

During her tenure in the Bindery she received a warning

slip for "argumentative attitude, probably as a result of lack
of interest in the job."

Her claim that she was retaliatorily

discharged from the Bindery, filed with the Connecticut Commissior
on Human Rights and Opportunities, was rejected by that Commissior
On or about February 19, 1975, Jones filed complaints with
the state and federal commissions charging the Company with sex
discrimination in its employment practices.

On March 2, 1976,

she received a right-to-sue letter from the State Commission.
On March 19, 1976, the state agency dismissed the complaint.

On

July 16, 1976, the federal agency found no probable cause to
believe there was a sex discrimination violation.
On March 11, 1976, Jones commenced a federal lawsuit charging
the Company with sex discrimination in its employment.

The suite

is styled, National Organization for Women and Lucille Crandall
v. General Dynamics Corporation, etc., U.S. Dist. Ct., Dist. of
Conn. (Civil H-176-123).

(Crandall and Jones are the same person;

she married Jones after the suit was commenced.)
as a Painter/Cleaner on March 22, 1976.

She was recalled

Following her discharge

on March 1, 1978, and pursuant to an agreement approved by the
federal court in that suit, the propriety of Jones' discharge was
made the subject of this arbitration under the collective bargain-*
ing agreement between the Union and the Company.

-4II. The Stipulated Issues
The following are the stipulated issues for decision in
this arbitration (1-39-40):*
1. Was the disciplinary action taken by
the Company against Mrs. Jones, identified
in grievance MTC-1460A-8, taken in retaliation for her having filed complaints of sex
discrimination against the Company before
federal, state agencies or in the United
States District Court?
2. If not, was the discharge of Mrs. Jones
for just cause?
Both before and after entering into the foregoing stipulation, the parties disputed its meaning (1-7-14, 1-21-24, 1-62-64)
This dispute also is reflected in their briefs.

The Company

claims that the arbitrator must rule on both issues.

Thus, even

if he finds that Jones was not discharged for just cause, he
must make a finding as to whether the discharge was retaliatory
(C.Br.2).** On the other hand, Jones takes the position that the
issues as framed provide the arbitrator with alternative grounds
for finding that she should be reinstated.

I conclude that the

terms of the stipulation require that I decide both the just
cause and the "retaliation" issues.
III. Contentions
The Company claims that Jones was

discharged for just

cause and not in retaliation for having filed charges of sex

''^References are to the volume (in roman numerals) and pages
(arable numerals) of the hearing minutes.
'"''References are to the Company's brief (C.Br.) and Jones' brief
(U.Br.)

-5-

discrimination.

According to the Company, this is a traditional

"progressive discipline" case in which Jones "was properly discharged for her cumulative record of infractions of legitimate
Company rules over a short period of time."

The Company asserts

that Jones had been "cited for infraction of Company rules six
times within less than four months, and twice received five-day
suspensions before being discharged.1:'

The Company submits that

in each instance, taken separately, discipline was properly
imposed, and that, cumulatively, these infractions warranted discharge. (C.Br.12).
The "progressive" disciplinary actions upon which the
Company relies are:
(1) October 28, 1977, a recorded warning for
failure to wear required safety equipment in
a designated work area;
(2) A five-day suspension on December 1, 1977,
for "disrespect and threatening a member of
management";
(3)A warning on December 21, 1977, for loafing;
(4) A warning slip for failure to wear safety
equipment on December 22, 1977;
(5) A written warning and a five-day suspension
on January 9, 1978 for loafing and being out of
of the assigned work area; and
(6) Discharged on February 10, 1978 for being
away from her work area after the resumption
of her shift. (This is the incident which
"triggered" her discharge and resulted in the
grievance involved in this arbitration.)
Though the extent of consideration is disputed, the Company
considered three additional warning slips issued to Jones on
February 4, 1975, January 13, 1977, and February 2, 1977, in
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reaching the decision to discharge her.
Article VII Paragraph 1 of the collective bargaining agreement provides:
Warning slips, except for absenteeism, will
be eliminated from the personnel records of
an employee after a period of six (6) months
provided no other warning slips have been
issued in the interim period.
As previously noted, the next warning slip

was issued on

October 28, 1977, almost nine months after the February 2, 1977
warning slip.

The Company concedes the applicability of the fore^

going contract clause to the three earlier warning slips, but
denies that the manner in which the Company utilized these slips
violated the agreement.
Citing her overall disciplinary record the Company argues
that Jones' history as an "industrial citizen" is such that it
does not present circumstances which warrant mitigating the
penalty of dismissal.

It further argues that in connection with

the final or "trigger" offense, Jones violated a proper and enforceable rule.

The Company denies that Jones was subjected to

a harsher penalty than has been imposed on other employees in
similar situations.
The Company contends that Jones has the burden of persuasion
on the issue of whether she was discharged in retaliation for
having filed sex discrimination complaints against the Company.
It claims she has not sustained this burden.

Not only is there

no probative evidence of retaliation, the Company argues, but the
evidence is wholly inconsistent with a claim of retaliation.
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(The pertinent evidence on this issue adduced by both sides as
with the other issues is examined later in this Opinion.)
Jones denies that she committed a violation of the rule
which was the subject of the "trigger" incident.

Alternatively

she argues that the rule constituted a violation of the collective
bargaining agreement* that it was not uniformly enforced; that
discharge is too harsh a penalty for her alleged misconduct in
view of lesser sanctions imposed on others similarly situated,
and that the Company's action was in retaliation for the litigation
and other actions she took in court and before the administrative
agencies in which she charged the Company with sex discrimination.
Discussion
On the issue of "just cause", and as a discharge case, the
burden is on the Company to show, clearly and convincingly, that
Jones committed the offense(s) charged.

If that burden is met,

the Company then has the further burden of showing that the ultime te
penalty of discharge was proper for the offense(s) committed.
Jones' discharge was "triggered" by the final incident of
February 9, 1978, when, as alleged by the Company, she was away
from her work area without permission.

Manifestly, if the Compan>

does not meet its burden of showing Jones' culpability in that
incident, the last step in the Company's progressive discipline
sequence would be unsupported, and the discharge based on that
full sequence could not be sustained.

In that event, so far as

the "just cause" issue in this case is concerned, Jones' prior
disciplinary record would be immaterial.

-8The incident which precipated Jones' discharge, the last in
a set of six violations in four months, occurred on February 9,
1978.

On that day Jones had lunch with her husband, a Company

employee.
AM.

Their authorized

lunch period was from 9:00 to 9:30

At about 9:25 AM she claims she started to return to her

work area when she realized she had to go to the restroom.
Jones testified she tried to find a supervisor in her work
area in order to obtain written permission, but she found only an
unidentified welder supervisor.
it was no longer required.

He refused to sign her LTC saying

Pressed by the need, she decided to

go without written permission.

When she arrived at the area in

which the restroom was located, she saw Curt Lowden, the Yard
Superintendent.

He was taking badge numbers from a group of men,

apparently as part of his duties to monitor

"floating."

Jones claims that she asked Lowden for permission to go to
the bathroom; that he gave it, and she entered the restroom.

In

the restroom, she found 10-15 other women and advised them Lowden
was outside taking badge numbers.

It was too crowded for her to

be able to use the toilets, she left after a short period.

When

she left, four others followed her and all five were stopped by
Lowden.

He took their badge numbers.

Jones protested that he

had given her permission, but he ignored her plea as well as her
request that a union steward be called.

Jones stated she went

to another restroom after this incident.
For the Company, Lowden denies he gave her permission to go
to the bathroom on February 9.

He did admit he had given her

permission some days prior to that day (11-30).

He claims that

-9he heard laughter coming from the women's restroom and suspected
a number of employees were where they should not have been at
that time.

Lowden waited outside.

took their badge numbers.

When the five came out, he

He recalled Jones' demand for a union

steward, but denies she claimed she had permission.

He referred

the badge numbers to Mr. John E. Fogarty a Company official.
Another employee, Sally Sowell, testified in support of Jones'
version.

She stated she heard Lowden give permission to Jones

while she was inside and Jones was in the outside hall.
corroborates what Jones said when she entered.

Sowell

Her version of

what took place in the restroom differed in some respects from
Jones'.

She recalled nine women in the restroom; Jones recalled

10-15, and later said 15.

Sowell said a woman left after Jones

entered, but was not stopped by Lowden.

Sowell also testified

Jones had used the facilities; whereas Jones said she had not.
Coleman, the EEO supervisor, testified that one of the four
women, named Sally, told him the women had no business being there.
He did not say it was Sally Sowell.
The Company relies on Lowden's version and the inconsistencies between Sowell's and Jones' testimony.

It also argues

that with all the talk by the women within the restroom, it is
"incredible" that she could have heard Lowden giving Jones permission to enter.

The Company points out that Lowden was talking

with the men at a distance from the women's restroom, not close
enough for Sowell to hear Lowden speaking to Jones.

The Company

characterizes the corroborating features of Sowell's testimony
as "pat" and the evidence offered on behalf of Jones as an attempt

-10to prove she was "set up" by Lowden.

Lowden was there, the

Company claims, as part of his "general sweep" of the restrooms
in which Jones and the others were found.

The Company argues

that inasmuch as there were restrooms closer to Jones' work area
than the one in the building in which she was found, she must have
been trying to avoid a timely return to the work area.

In re-

sponse, Jones claims she was fearful of going to the closer bathroom because these were areas patrolled by supervisors with whom
she had had a number of disciplinary and other unpleasant experiences over a period in the very recent past.

She feared they

would again discipline her because of their hostility.
The Labor Time Cards
The Rule
Some understanding of the operation of the LTC rules is
important because the "triggering incident" is based on an
alleged unauthorized or overextended restroom visit.

On Monday,

November 28, 1977* the Company introduced a daily time card callec
a labor time card (LTC) to replace the weekly time card the worke:
had previously punched.*
card.

Work assignments were entered on the

In addition, employees were required to obtain a super-

visor's written permission to leave a work area for any reason,

'-The announcement of the LTC system, dated November 22, 1977,
states it was to begin on November 27. (U.Ex.3) Actually it began
on November 27th or 28th. Jones' assertion that the unilateral
imposition of the LTC was an invalid exercise of power by the
Company is not determined in view of my disposition of this case.

-11including trips to restrooms.

The time of day an employee left

the area and the time of return, as well as the reason for leaving, were required to be noted on the card.
initialed by the supervisor.

Entries were to be

Several witnesses testified with

respect to the implementation of the LTC rules.

While there were

some differences in their testimony there appeared to be general
agreement that the hourly workers did not react kindly towards
the new rules which were instituted by a new management team
concerned with what they viewed as nonproductive utilization of
working hours.

There appears to have been no real disagreement

between union and management that this was a problem which shoulc
be addressed.

(On March 20, 1978, shortly after the "triggering

incident" now under discussion, the rule was changed.)
According to the Paint Department supervisor the rule was
intended to operate in the following manner when an employee had
to go to the restroom.

A supervisor was expected not to refuse

permission to go to the bathroom.

However, written permission

signified by an entry on the LTC was required.

Permission was to

be obtained from the employee's own supervisor or another supervisor, if the former was not available.

If a worker could not

find a supervisor after returning from the restroom, the employee
was to return to work and not expend time looking for a supervise
to sign him in.

In the event of an "emergency" and the non-

availability of a supervisor, the employee could inform a coworker that he was going to the restroom.
not limited to lunch periods.

Restroom visits were
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Enforcement of The Rule
There is a dispute between the parties over whether the rule
was generally or uniformly applied in the context of restroom
visits.

Thus, John Stevens, Chief Steward of the painter's

union for the past ten months and the holder of various union
positions for several years prior to the hearing testified
(11-141):
"it was a haphazard rule. It was being done
in some areas and no others. Some cases
you could tell your co-worker and some cases
you couldn't. And in some cases they would
sign and some cases they won't."
***
"It wasn't consistent, and often we go from
one boss to another, and one supervisor may
have had it one way and you go to work for
another boss for one day on a specific job
and he would have a different way to do it."
Albert Austin testified it was his impression the rule was
not uniformly enforced throughout the yard and he had first-hand
knowledge of non-enforcement in his own Inside Machine Shop.
(11-164).
Several other workers testified they rarely obtained written
permission to go to the bathroom (IV-12, 74, 84, 95) and Jones
testified that on the day of the triggering incident a welding
supervisor refused to sign her LTC explaining they did not do
that anymore. (11-182).
The Company relies in part on the testimony of Gary Burgess,
the Assistant Superintendent in the Welding Department on the
second shift in Building 260 where Jones claimed a supervisor
would not sign her LTC. He testified he had personally instructed
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his supervisors that written permission was required.

The Company

concludes it is "incredible that an unidentified welding supervisor would have stated (to Jones) that it was no longer Company
policy to sign people out." (C.Br.

40).

The Company also points out that much of Austin's impression
were not first-hand, but were obtained second-hand from his
brother-in-law.

In addition, the Company asserts that the LTCs

of at least one employee (Robert Laurence) show he often received
written permission to leave the area, and the Company offered
explanations of why the cards of others did not show written
permissions. (C.Br. 48-49).

The Union brief asserts that Laurence

LTCs did not comply with the rule because they contained only the
notation "permission to leave" without sign in and sign out times.
The Company also points out that Jones' LTC shows many
written permissions.

(Indeed, too many, the Company argues).
OPINION

Based on the record before me, I find that the evidence on
whether Jones did or did not get permission to go to the restroom
on the day and at the time in question, is sharply contradictory,
offsetting, and hence inconclusive one way or the other.

I do not

find that Jones did get permission from Lowden; but rather that
the Company, with the burden to do so, has not clearly shown that
she did not obtain some form of acceptable permission.
Perhaps the most telling fact which creates the offsetting
nature of the evidence is that Lowden, the supervisor who "wrote
up" Jones for the "triggering incident" concedes he had given her
verbal permission to go to the restroom on a day earlier than the

-14triggering incident (11-30).

That is evidence not only that he

utilized oral rather than written permission as an acceptable
implementation of the rule, but that it would not have been
unusual or inconsistent with his practices if he gave Jones oral
permission on the critical day of February 9th.

Hence, a

disciplinary penalty would not be justified if an employee obtaine
oral but not written permission.

The narrow question here there-

fore is whether the Company has shown by the quantum of probative
evidence required in such cases, that Jones did not obtain oral
permission to go to the restroom on February 9th.
I do not consider it unlikely or improbable that in the
tumult of the "sweep of the restrooms", Lowden forgot that he
had given Jones permission.

Lowden's denial is countered not only

by Jones' testimony, but by the testimony of Sowell that when
Lowden took the badge numbers of the women, Jones was courteous,
asked for a union steward, and, significantly, advised Lowden
that she had asked him for permission.
The Company's reliance on the inconsistencies between
Sowell's and Jones' version does not go to the core of the event.
At most collateral, and certainly not determinative of the critical
issue of permission, are the matters dealing with whether Jones
had used the facility or how many (10, 15 or 9) women there were
in the restroom at the time.

Nor do I find those "inconsistencies"

so unusual as to bear on credibility.

Nor is it inherently "in-

credible" that Sowell heard Lowden and Jones speaking outside the
restroom.

Obviously, if sound traveled to the outside from within;

the reverse is also possible.

Again this is not to say that what
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Sowell said she heard has been proved, but rather, that her
testimony, with the possibilities stated, is a relevant ingredient
in the offsetting and indeterminative nature of the evidence on
the core question.
Additionally, that Lowden had given Jones permission on a
previous day, adds credibility to the reasonable possibility that
he gave permission on February 9th.

Indeed, under that circum-

stance, would he have refused permission if asked? Is it not
possible that, through confusion3 the permission he concedely
gave was not on an earlier day, but actually February 9th?

In

short, I find as an evidentiary matter, that I cannot discount the
testimoney of Jones and Sowell and accept only the testimony of
Lowden.

Weighing it all against the standard and burden required

of the Company to show to the arbitrator's satisfaction that Jones
went to the restroom without permission, I must find that the
Company's case falls short of meeting that essential test.
Regarding the Company's rule requiring employees to obtain
written permission, noted on their LTCs, to leave a work area,
it is well settled that to be disciplinarily enforceable, a work
rule, unilaterally

promulgated by an employer must be reasonable,

well publicized and/or disseminated to and anong the affected
employees, and must be consistently and uniformly applied.
make no determination on whether the rule was reasonable.

I
I find

that it was promulgated and probably made known to the affected
employees; but that it was not consistently and uniformly applied
to employees similarly situated.

The inconsistent or non-uniform

application of the rule has been adequately documented.

An analysis
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logical inferences drawn therefrom, and the testimony of Austin,
Stevens and other employees support that conclusion.
Exhibit U-36 consisted of all Paint Department labor time
cards for the week ending February 10, 1978.

(The incident for

which Jones was discharged occurred on February 9, 1978.)

The

uncontradicted analysis of these cards shows (U. Br. 46-49):
(1) 20.77> of the cards had permission which
could be construed as being for the restroom.
This includes entries where the card does not
state the reason for which permission to leave
was granted;
(2) 23.5% of the 20.770 or 4.870 expressly state
that permission was for the restroom;
(3) 1/3 of the 20.77o fail to show the sign out
and sign in time, contrary to the rule.
(4) Jones had a slightly higher rate of signed
permissions than others who obtained permission
as well as a higher rate than the entire group
of Paint Department workers , 8070 of whom show
no permission.
It is difficult to believe that 807, of the workers in this
department did not go to the bathroom during their shift.

Of

course, they all might have gone during their half hour lunch
break.

However, if they went before or after lunch, they needed

written permission.

In what surely must be an unscientific

survey but one which does appeal to common experience six
witnesses were asked how frequently they went to the restrooms
during working hours.

Three responded twice, one stated he

went 2-3 times and two 3-4 times.
It is not likely that 807, of the work force either never
went to the restroom during working hours or went only during
the lunch break.

What is more likely is that the permission rule
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except for Burgess and Lowden, this is the thrust of the testimon
of those who addressed the subject.
One additional fact supports this conclusion.
1978, the Company altered

On March 20,

the rule and eliminated the require-

ment that written permission be obtained for restroom visits.
The change is not referred to in order to excuse violations of
the prior rule.

It is of significance only because it is im-

probable, in my view, that a prior rule would be unilaterally
withdrawn or changed if it had been effective and uniformly
administered.

The Company offered no reason for the change.

It is my conclusion that the Company has failed to show that
the permission rule (whether permission was given or obtained in
writing or verbally) was uniformly applied at the time of the
triggering incident; that there is probative evidence showing that
its application was inconsistent and non-uniform; and hence
discipline imposed for its violation cannot be justified.
The Reference to the Warnings of February 4, 1975
and January 13 and February 2, 1977
The Company, argues that it was proper for it to take the
"stale" warning slips into account for either of the following
two reasons without violating paragraph I of Article VII of the
collective bargaining agreement.

First, they could be used to

rebut a claim by the employee that she was unaware the current
violations were serious and that the Company deemed them to be
serious.

Second, they may be used as a mitigating factor in

determining what sanctions should be imposed.

More

particularly

the Company contends that warning slips which pre-date the
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review of the employee as and industrial citizen.... to show what
type of an overall employee that person had been (11-44)"....
and "in terms of mitigation

"(11-71).

It also asserts that

it may resort to an earlier safety violation to rebut Jones'
claim that she was unaware that a later safety equipment
violation was serious.

Though it is obvious, inasmuch as Jones

was discharged, that the old warning slips were not considered
"in mitigation", and though there is some question as to whether
Jones really asserted a lack of awareness of the seriousness of
the safety violation, those matters are irrelevant in my judgement.
Article VII paragraph 1 of the contract is clear and unconditional.
It requires the "elimination" from the personnel record (emphasis
added) of warning slips after six months.

To my mind "elimina-

tion" means that they no longer exist for any purpose. "Elimination" precludes and proscribes use, reference to, or any consideration of those warning slips.

Hence, the Company erred and Mr.

Fogarty was contractually wrong when as he conceded, the three
earlier warning slips "played a part", albeit a "minor part" in
his decision to discharge Jones.
tion"argument is illogical.

Indeed the Company's "mitiga-

It advances the impracticable

argument that evidence of prior violations can serve to mitigate
the penalty.

It is obvious that they can serve to increase the

penalty, but not mitigate it.

The very authority relied on by

the Company refutes its position.

The Company refers to two

arbitrations involving it and the Metal Trades Council (C.Br. 57,
58) as examples of the use of these stale warning slips on the
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issue of mitigation.

Although I am not bound to follow them,

they are clearly distinguishable from this case.

They present

the question of whether the arbitrator may consider the employee's
entire record in determining whether or not to mitigate a penalty
They do not authorize the Company to use them in the first instance to determine either the probable existence of a violation
or the extent of penalty.

In addition, in each case a dispute

about the method of calculating the six months period was resolved in a manner which would have kept the warning slips within the six months limitation period.
Even if there is some merit to the position that the
employee's entire record including the three warning slips,
should be considered in determining whether or not to mitigate
an imposed penalty* it does not follow that it may be taken into
account by the employer in determining whether there was a
violation and in assessing the penalty in the first instance.
As mitigation of the penalty did not result, I can only conclude
that resort to the three earlier warning slips played some part
in the Company's decision to impose the extreme penalty of
dismissal.

Accordingly, the Company's consideration of those

arlier warning slips was prejudicial to Jones, and violated the
contract.

*As a result of what I deem to be a typographical error the
Company's brief inaccurately quotes from one of the decisions
when it notes it is to be used in considering modification of
"a proposed penalty." The decision refers to "an imposed penalty.
See C.Br. p.58 and General Dynamics Corporation and Metal Trades
Council, (MTC Grievance 1309A-8) (Sept. 18, 1978) at 35-36.
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I agree with the Company that Jones has the burden of
showing that her discharge, in whole or in part, was retaliatorily
motivated, within the terms of the stipulated issue.

Jones has

not met that burden.
There is credible evidence that a number of Company employees
resented or disliked Jones.

The reason for these attitudes varied

They ranged from just plain dislike of her personality through
resentment of her because the employee did not like women on the
job.

Some resented her because she did not appear sufficiently

physically attractive.

Others believe she was not carrying her

weight, while some believed a woman is incapable of doing the
work assigned.

Directly related to the retaliation issue, some,

including the Company, viewed her lawsuit and other official
complaints as an unwelcome attack or as an attempt by her to
obtain something for nothing.
case of retaliation.

However none of this makes out a

The real question is whether the discharge

was a response to Jones' legal and administrative complaints
against the Company.

I conclude the evidence falls short of

establishing that response.

In Jones' brief, citing court

decisions the elements of a prima facie case of retaliation are
set forth as:
(1) the employee engaged in protected activity;
(2) the employer knew about it;
(3) the employee was subsequently discharged
and
(4) direct evidence of retaliatory motive or
in the absence of direct evidence, that the
discharge followed the protected activity
within such a period of time that the court
can infer a retaliatory motive.
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Upon such proof, the burden shifts to the employer to show
a legitimate reason for the discharge.

If shown, the employee

may show the reason is a pretext. (U.Br. p.30).
The issue in this case centers on item (4).

Jones argues

that the change in her record before and after January,

1975,

plus the records of how others were treated, plus evidence of
retaliatory motives on the part of some supervisory personnel
establishes a prima case of retaliation; and that it rebuts the
Company's just cause claim by proving the alleged reason for
discharge was a pretext for retaliation.
She relies on the difference in her record before and after
January 1975, when she filed her

first complaints.

Prior to

that time she had received a commendation, a satisfactory perform
ance evaluation and no warning slips.

Thereafter she received

warning slips, suspensions, "harassment" and was discharged.
The fact is that she also received two unsatisfactory work
reviews and was discharged from a job in the Bindery for unsatisfactory work.

Also the events cited by Jones in alleging

retaliation, may be logically interpreted as a deteriorating
attitude on her part, following her 1975 dismissal.

In short,

the facts on which she relies are just not persuasive evidence
from which retaliation can be inferred, within the meaning of
the foregoing court opinion.
Jones also claims that she received harsher treatment than
others similarly situated.
this point.

The evidence presented was sparse on

It consisted of some impressions by witnesses with

limited information (e.g., IV-28-30) and several disciplinary
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records of selected employees.
duced other records in rebuttal.

(U.22-30).

The Company intro-

(C.Br. 33-40).

It is not

possible to conclude anything from these records; the total number
17, is very small and it was apparent that factors unique to each
determined the penalty imposed.

In some instances, there was no

penalty recorded because the employee resigned in lieu of being
discharged.

Jones' own witnesses conceded that a particular

penalty was not automatic (e.g. III-167), and that it did not
automatically attach to a particular stage of the progressive
discipline program.

Obviously, discretion was properly exercised,

on a case by case basis, depending on the circumstances thereof.
Standing alone, the records of other employees placed in evidence
in this proceeding do not show unexplained

or discriminatory

differences between the Company's treatment of Jones and its
treatment of the others, to support the charge of retaliation.
Jones states that named supervisory personnel engaged in
specific acts of retaliation and harassment for a period of
slightly more than one year prior to this discharge.

She argues

that the Company had the responsibility to put a stop to this,
but failed to do so and acquiesced in the discipline imposed on
her by those supervisors (U.Br. 33-37).

There is testimony that

some supervisory personnel were motivated by revenge in their
relationship with Jones, and there is offsetting testimony that
they were not.

Even assuming the accuracy of the former there is

insufficient evidence of official Company knowledge of or acquiescence in any such motivation or of Company policy founded on
such motive.

Most importantly there is insufficient evidence that

connects any such motives to the Company's decision to discharge,
or specifically to the person who effectuated it.

There is no
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Jones, engaged in, knew of or acquiesced in such conduct or had
a retaliatory motive.

Rather, the evidence shows he was con-

concerned about the motives and conduct of some supervisors in
connection with earlier incidents (11-55,83) and Mr. Coleman
had ordered supervisors to treat Jones like any other employee.
Indeed, the evidence shows that some employees and supervisors
were angered because they believed the Company was providing
special favorable treatment for Jones in order to avoid even an
appearance of retaliation.

Whether the Company, in fact, was

bending over backward, is unclear.

What is clear however is

that those Company officials charged with policy and decision
making, such as Fogarty and Coleman, tried to avoid the fact
and appearance of special treatment for Jones because of the
pending disputes.

In view of that policy, a radically different

act, in the form of retaliation would have been both incongruous,
and highly precarious.

I simply am not persuaded that any

retaliatory motivation can be imputed to Fogarty or Coleman, or
can be inferred as Company policy.
For all the foregoing reasons, the Undersigned duly
designated as the Arbitrator and having duly heard the proofs
and allegations of the above named parties, makes the following
AWARD
The discharge of Lucille Crandall Jones was
not in retaliation for her having filed complaints of sex discrimination against the
Company before federal, state agencies or in
the United States District Court.
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The discharge of Lucille Crandall Jones was
not for just cause. She shall be reinstated
with full benefits and back pay less her earnings, if any, from gainful employment during
the period of the discharge. If she received
any unemployment insurance benefits she shall
return the amount received to the appropriate
agency of the State of Connecticut to be credited
to the Company's account.
Jones' request for counsel fees and for the
costs of this arbitration is denied in this
arbitration forum. However this is without
prejudice to any petition she may file with
the Federal Court for such fees and costs and
is without prejudice to the rights of all parties
hereto in connection with any such petition.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: October 2, 1979
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )
On this second day of October, 1979, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBIT1ATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
International Union of Electrical,
Radio and Machine Workers AFL-CIO,
Local 707

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #53 30 0040 78

and
General Electric Company

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate Article XXVIII
Section 1 of the 1976-1979 GE-IUE National
Agreement on April 4, 1977 when it hired
Jesse Harris for the Laborer-Truck Driver,
R-14 position rather than upgrading James
Braswell to the position? If so, what shall
be the remedy?
A hearing was held in Cleveland, Ohio on November 8, 1978,
at which time Mr. Braswell, hereinafter referred to asc the
"grievant" and representatives of the above named parties
appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer

evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
Article XXVIII Section 1 of the contract reads:
1. Standard for filling open jobs and upgrading
The Company will, to the extent practical,
give first consideration for job openings
and upgrading to present employees, when
employees with the necessary qualifications
are available. In upgrading employees to
higher rated jobs, the Company will take into consideration as an important factor, the
relative length of continuous service of the
employees who it finds are qualified for such
upgrading.

-2This Arbitrator has interpreted and applied the foregoing
contract section in two prior Awards; International Union of
Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, Local 300, AFL-CIO -andGeneral Electric Company, American Arbitration Association Case
#1530 0217 77 dated October 13, 1977, and International Union of
Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO -and- General
Electric Company, American Arbitration Association Case #53 30
0345 77 dated February 17, 1977, involving respectively, upgrading disputes at the Schenectady, New York and Cleveland, Ohio
plants.
I stated in the former and reiterated in the latter that:
The
contract language, particularly
the phrase: "....who it finds are qualified
for such upgrading" (emphasis added) vests
the Company with the unilateral and discretionary authority to determine which employees are
qualified to be given consideration for a promotion. Of course the Company may not abuse that
discretion or exercise it in an arbitrary or
capricious manner.
I went on to state in the latter case that:
"The issue is not whether this Arbitrator
thinks the grievant is qualified or unqualified
for promotion
but rather whether the
Company's decision that he was unqualified was
so devoid of factual basis and so unsupported
by relevant work criteria as to be arbitrary,
capricious or discriminatory."
^x'
,.-"'""
In the instant case the grievant was found by the Company to
be unqualified for the Truck Driver, R-14 job because of monocular vision." His sight in one eye is significantly impaired.
That he is afflicted with this condition is undisputed.

Under

-3-

that circumstance, and no matter how much I admire the grievant1
determination to maintain and undertake normal occupational
activities, and even if

there was a possibility that he would

operate the vehicles required by the job classification without
accident, I cannot judge his disqualification by the Company to
be arbitrary, capricious or discriminatory.
That he drove the Tractor-Front Loader during the winter of
1976-1977 and again in 1978 to remove snow/ does not mean that he
is or became physicall qualified to drive the three vehicles
(a tractor, a payloader and a 3/4 ton pick-up truck) required by
the Labor-Truck Driver R-14 classification.

More to the point,

in my view, is that a physical condition which as here, is
manifestly related to the safe operation of vehicles, including
one vehicle which leaves the property (the pick-up truck), is
neither cured nor waived as grounds for disqualification merely
because the Company, imprudently

or otherwise permitted the

grievant to operate one of the vehicles (the tractor-front loader)
on the Company's property previously.
The Company's determination was not a violation of Article
IV (Addendum) 4(a).

It did not discriminate against the grievant

because of a physical handicap.

Rather and regrettably for the

grievant, his physical handicap is clearly relevent to the safe
operation of the vehicles in question, and hence his disqualification was reasonably based on that relevant disability.

A fair

and logical reliance on a relevant physical disability as the

-4basis for disqualification, is not, "discrimination

against

(an)

employee because of physical .... handicap .„.. in regard to any
position for which the employee is qualified." (emphasis added)
The fact is that because of the grievant's handicap, he was
found physically "unqualified." I have held that for that reason
the Company had reasonable grounds to disqualify him from the
promotion he sought.

It follows therefore that he was not

deprived of a job for which, his handicap

notwithstanding, he

is qualified.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the parties
makes the following AWARD
The Company did not violate Article XXVIII
Section 1 of the 1976-1979 GE-IUE National
Agreement on April 4, 1977, when it hired
Jesse Harris for the Laborer-Truck Driver,
R-14 position rather than upgrading James
Braswell to the position.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: January
1979
STATE OF New York )sg .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this
day of January, 1979, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
IUE, Radio & Machine Workers Local 301

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1530 0264 78

and
General Electric Company

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge
Robert Nelson? If not what shall be the
remedy ?
A hearing was held in Schenectady, New York on October 3,
1978 at which time Mr. Nelson, hereinafter referred to as the
"grievant" and representatives of the above named Union and
Company appeared. All concerned were afforded full opportunity
to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The Union and

Company filed post-hearing briefs.
I accept as credible the testimony of the complaining
employee and the testimony of the witnesses in support of the
Company's case.

Based on that testimony together with the

grievants' undisputed prior offense involving a similar type of
misconduct, I am satisfied that the Company has met its burden
in establishing that the grievant committed the acts charged.
Those acts constitute a dischargeable offense.
I do not believe that the complainant and the other witnesse
I
fabricated the charge against the grievant to cover up, neutralize
or distract from any allegation by the grievant that he found
them smoking marijuana in the boiler room.

That the boiler room

-2-

may have been used for that purpose by some employees (and may
thereby account for the particles of marijuana later found among
the sweepings from the boiler room floor) does not mean that the
grievant did not personally and physically abuse the complainant.
The same is true, even if the other witnesses were in the boiler
room smoking marijuana at the time that the grievant committed
the acts against the complainant.

The point is that the former

allegation, even if true, does not automatically vitiate or even
cast evidentiary doubt on the charge against the grievant.
Significant in this regard, in my view, is that, even in the
grievant's testimony, there is no direct charge that the complain
ant was smoking - but only that one of the other witnesses was
doing so (with a pipe) and that the grievant "assumed they
passed it around."

The fact is that the complainant did not

enter the boiler room with the other witnesses, but rather with
and at the suggestion of the grievant.

Even under the grievant's

theory and defense., in the absence of direct evidence, it is far
fetched and unbelievable that the complainant, who was in the
boiler room at the grievant's suggestion to discuss a work
problem, would change from that purpose to join other employees
who entered subsequently, in smoking marijuana.
In short, I am in no way convinced that the complainant
had anything to hide or "cover-up", even under the grievant's
defense, and therefore I fail to see why the complainant would
join in any "conspiracy" against the grievant or support any false
story of what he did.
is not believable.

Hence the grievant's "conspiracy" defense

-3-

The Undersigned duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above
named parties makes the following AWARD:
There was just cause for the discharge
of Robert Nelson.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: January 8, 1979
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this eighth day of January, 1979, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
™ — » — — ~ — — -• — «.•—-» — — _ — . « _ — _ _ _ « _ « _ _ _ , « « _ _ « _ « .

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
International Union of Electrical,
Radio and Machine Workers, Local 201
AFL-CIO

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1130 1809 76
N.D. #48,735

and
General Electric Company

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate Article XXVIII
Section 1 of the 1973-1976 G.E.-IUE
National Agreement when Roland Mailloux
was upgraded to an IR-20 assembly classification on March 2, 1976, rather than
downgrading Joseph Roselli to the classification? If so, what shall be the remedy?
Hearings were held in Boston, Massachusetts on May 20 and
July 21, 1977 and June 19 and 20, 1978, at which time representatives of the above named Union and Company appeared and were
afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses.

Both sides filed post-

hearing briefs.
The Company upgraded Roland Mailloux on March 2, 1976 from
the R-19 position to a job opening in the IR-20 assembly classification.

Mr. Roselli, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant

who held an R-23 rated job and had greater seniority than Mailloux
claims that the Company's action is in violation of Article
XXVIII Section 1 of the contract.
1.

That contract provision reads:

Standard for filling open jobs and upgrading

The Company will, to the extent practical, give
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first consideration for job openings and
upgrading to present employees, when
employees with the necessary qualifications
are available. In upgrading employees to
higher rated jobs, the Company will take
into consideration as an important factor,
the relative length of continuous service
of the employees who it finds are qualified
for such upgrading.
The Union asserts that based on the grievant's greater
seniority he was entitled to the IR-20 assembly job under both
sentences of the foregoing contract provision.
Based on a careful study of the considerable record in this
proceeding I am satisfied and conclude that the identical contrac
questions as presented herein were previously decided in the
prior arbitration Awards of Arbitrators Sidney L. Cahn and
Louis Yagoda (N.D. 46,158 and 38,509 respectively).
Arbitrator Cahn stated that the first sentence of the foregoing contract provision
"makes no reference to nor provides for
the filling of open jobs on the basis
of length of continuous service.
(it)
could well be deemed applicable only to
those situations in which "present employee'
must be measured either for 'job opening'
or an 'upgrading' against applicants from
the street."
Arbitrator Yagoda ruled similarly.

He stated that the first

sentence
"does not provide the parties with a means
or standard by which to choose between or
among more than one candidate for a job
opening, whether as a sole management prerogative, or according to comparative qualifications, or on the basis of length of
service or any combination thereof. In
short, it merely establishes the principle
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that qualified and available incumbent employees are to get the preference over new
hires, to the extent that it is practical
to do so. The Management complies with this
sentence when, as in the present instance,
it fills the vacancy from its present personnel
rather than resorting to outside recruiting.
Such result is proof that first consideration
has been given to an insider."
Applied to the instant dispute where the competition for the
1R-20 assembly job was between two persons employed by the
Company, it is obvious that the grievant's reliance on the first
sentence would be misplaced and that in that respect his grievanc
would have been denied by Arbitrators Cahn and Yagoda.
Arbitrators Cahn and Yagoda also ruled that the second sentence of the pertinent contract provision applies only to upgrade situations. Cahn stated that
"the length of continuous service may be
disregarded by the Company in cases where
the move does not involve an upgrade to a
higher rated job."
In that case Cahn ruled against a grievant seeking a lateral
transfer even though the grievant had greater continuous service
than the employee selected.
Yagoda reasoned that the terms "upgrade" and "higher rated"
were

"more probably intended by the parties as
references to an existing rate structure
or schedule rather than as references to
earning results."

He therefore declined to construe "rated" as referring to
anticipated or potential earnings and instead accepted the
Company's position that the R number system governs upgrades.
Consequently he, like Cahn, upheld the Company's action in

-4upgrading one employee while refusing to laterally transfer a
grievant with longer continuous service.

Additionally, Yagoda,

noting that the Union unsuccessfully sought to modify the contract
language in the 1969 and 1973 negotiations so as to apply seniority to all job openings as well as upgrades interpreted those
efforts as a
"recognition by the Union that the omission
of 'job openings' in the second sentence of
Article XXVIII Section 1 did not afford employees the right for 'lateral' movement of
the kind in issue here and the fact that
their effort to widen the statement in that
respect was unsuccessful may legitimately
be construed as a recognized retention of
the meaning which the Union now challenges
in these proceedings."
In the case before me the grievant claims a right based on
his seniority to the IR-20 job because it will pay him more total
compensation and that in that regard it should be deemed an upgrade.

Clearly, under the Cahn and Yagoda rulings, the job which

the grievant seeks is neither an upgrade nor even a lateral
transfer but rather a downward move within the hierarchy of the
job classification system.

The IR-20 job which the grievant

seeks is a lesser rated job than the R-23 job he held within
the Company's rated system, as previously interpreted. Moreover
in view of the prior rulings that earnings are not determinative
of the rating of one job compared to another, the transfer the
grievant sought would not be construed as an "upgrade" merely
because it may result in higher incentive earnings.

Hence it is

manifest that the grievant's claim to a lower rated job within
the classified hierarchy on the theory that it was an "upgrade"
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because of higher earnings, would be denied by Arbitrators Cahn
and Yagoda under the second sentence of the applicable contract
language.
The question narrows to whether I should deem the prior decisions
of Arbitrators Cahn and Yagoda as dispositive of the instant
case, or whether I should judge the present matter de novo0
We all know that arbitrators are not technically bound by
the decisions of other arbitrators in prior arbitration cases.
We also know that this does not mean that prior Awards and
Opinions in point are to be disregarded or lightly overturned.
The accepted rule seems to be that where the parties are the same,
the same contract language is in dispute, where the facts are
substantially similar and where there is sufficient evidence in
support of the prior arbitrator's decision or where the contract
is reasonably susceptible to the interpretation which he places
on it, that prior decision should enjoy a presumption of validity.
I accept that view.

I am not persuaded that a subsequent

arbitrator should overturn a prior decision by a different
arbitrator, thereby presenting the parties with conflicting and
irreconcileable decisions on the same contract question, unless
in the judgement of the subsequent arbitrator the prior decision
is contractually and evidentially insupportable-or in short,
palpably wrong.
and Yagoda.

That is not the case with the decisions of Cahn

I find their decisions to be reasonable and support-

able interpretations of the critical contract language.

There-

fore, as the facts in the case before me are sufficiently similar
to the facts before those two arbitrators, under contract language
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undisputedly the same, and between the same contracting parties,
the rulings of those two prior decisions shall obtain to the
present dispute.
Accordingly the Undersigned, duly designated as the
Arbitrator and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the above named parties makes the following AWARD:
The Company did not violate Article XXVIII
Section 1 of the 1973-1976 G0E.-IUE National
Agreement when Ronald Mailloux was upgraded
to an IR-20 assembly classification on March
2, 1976, rather than downgrading Joseph
Roselli to the classification.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: April 16, 1979
STATE OF New York )
ss .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this sixteenth day of April, 1979 before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
IDE Local 301

OPINION AND AWARD

and
General Electric Company

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge of
Patrick Keefe? If not what shall be the
remedy?
A hearing was held in Schenectady, New York on April 2,
1979 at which time Mr. Keefe, hereinafter referred to as the
"grievant" and representatives of the above named Union and
Company appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity

to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The parties filed

post-hearing briefs.
The grievant was discharged after receiving a "fourth
warning notice" within a thirteen month period.

His fourth

offense was "for falsification of production vouchers."
For some time the Company has had a policy and has followed
the practice of imposing the penalty of discharge for a fourth
disciplinary offense within a one year period. More recently
it has extended the measuring period for its progressive discipline
sequence to one year "plus." (e.g. in the instance case, thirteen
months).

Its one year policy and practice was not and is not

contested by the Union.

However the Union questions herein the

propriety of extending that policy to additional months beyond

-2one year.
I do not find the expansion of the disciplinary measuring
period to thirteen months to be unfair or unreasonable, and
indeed prior arbitrations have upheld the implementation of
the Company's policy and practice for periods up to and including fifteen months.

I do not disagree with those prior

rulings.
However, to sustain the Company's policy and practice does
not mean that there cannot or should not be any flexibility in
its implementation or that there may not be occasions, albeit
infrequent, where the penalty of discharge after the accumulation
of four warning notices within the measuring period may be inappropriate, unjust or subject to mitigation.
Based on and limited to the particular circumstances of
the instant case, I conclude that the latter exception is
applicable.

The grievant's "falsification of production vouchers",

though certainly not excusable, was not as
charge suggests.

egregious as the

He recorded two hours of work on two operations

which he did not perform and on two machines he did not operate.
I am satisfied that he did it not to gain idle time for himself,
but to camouflage what he thought was an excessive amount of
time he had consumed on another operation and to avoid criticism
for that from his supervisor.

He gained no monetary benefit

and had planned to cure the fictitious time credit by actually
manufacturing the small amount of claimed production over the
next following days.

Though he initially lied about what he

had done, he quickly thereafter admitted the offense, apologised

-3expressed contrition, and, in my view, is now sincerely contrit^.
His prior disciplinary record, including the earlier three
relevant warning notices do not show a similar type of offense.
Importantly, though I am persuaded that the grievant's
offense was different from and more serious than the apparent
long standing practice by employees of accumulating "kitties"
of items produced for different time and credit allocation,
and from the apparent practice of some supervisors who
manipulate time and production records to hide excessive "downtime" or the use of more time than is acceptable in "setups,"
I believe that the "climate" created by those two latter practices,
contributed to his actions.
"Kitties" differ from the grievant's offense in that they
are made up of goods actually produced, though credited at times
other than when made and often to employees who did not do the
work.

Though the Company has not approved of "kitties", and

the record is unclear on whether Company officials have full
knowledge of the practice, I do not believe that they have been
totally unaware of that practice.

It is apparent to me that

the Company did not take vigorous steps to stop this particular
type of record "falsification."

The manipulation of time records

by supervisors is another acknowledged record "falsification"
which arguably may be less serious than the grievant's undisclosed falsification because, having done it, supervision can
account for it.

But, obviously it is a "rearrangement" of

Company time and production records, different from what actually
took place.

To the extent practiced by supervision it constituted

-4condonation of imprecise records which, together with the
maintenance of "kitties" reasonably could have led the grievant
to believe, albeit erroneously, that his offense was within the
same frame, and not serious.
In short I find the foregoing circumstances as mitigating
factors, which in this case should temper the otherwise legitimate and proper Company policy of imposing the penalty of
discharge with the fourth disciplinary offense within the
measuring period.

The just penalty in this case is a disciplinary

suspension and a stern warning to the grievant that any further
offenses by him would be grounds for dismissal.
Accordingly, the Undersigned, duly designated as the
Arbitrator and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the above named parties, makes the following AWARD
The discharge of Patrick Keefe is reduced
to a disciplinary suspension. He shall be
reinstated without back pay. The period
of time between his discharge and reinstatement
shall be deemed the period of his suspension.
He is expressly warned that if he commits any
further offenses within a reasonable measuring
period, in the judgement of this Arbitrator he
would be subject to discharge.

DATE: June 11, 1979
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York )

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

On this llth day of June, 1979, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
International Union of Electrical,
Radio & Machine Workers, Local 283

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1130 0745 79
N.D. 59060

and

General Electric Company
Providence, Rhode Island

The stipulated issue is:
Did the grievants, Raymond Berg and Ronald
Seynave1 have the minimum qualifications
required under the provisions of the second
sentence of Section 1 of Article XXVIII to
be upgraded to the General Maintenance "A"
(R-19) classification in December 1978?
If the arbitrator determines that the grievants did have the minimum qualifications required for such upgrading, did the Company
violate Article XXVIII when it upgraded
Russell DesGranges and John Pina rather than
the grievants? If so, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on September 5, 1979 at which time
representatives of the above named Union and Company appeared.
All were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's

Oath was waived.

1. The grievance of Sabino Albanese was included in the original
grievance, but because of his failure to appear at the hearing, was dismissed without prejudice.

-2I find that in deciding the instant case I am bound by
three of my prior decisions in which I interpreted and applied
the second sentence of Section 1 of Article XXVIII2 of the
contract.
To deal with the instant matter in the manner requested by
the Union would be to ignore those prior decisions and to reverse my interpretation of the foregoing contract clause, as
set forth therein.
This is not to say that this Arbitrator is obdurately
wedded to his prior decisions.

Rather, those decisions, inter-

preting the very contract clause in question in the instant
case, and under the same collective bargaining agreement, must
be accorded at least a presumption of continued validity and
applicability unless, in a subsequent proceeding, that interpretation is appropriately relitigated, I am asked or required
to reconsider my prior ruling, and I am shown that that prior
ruling was wrong.
The trouble with the Union's case in the present matter
before me is that it does not reargue the critical contract interpretation involved and it does not ask that I reconsider my prior
interpretative rulings.

Indeed the Union made no mention of my

2. International Union Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, Local
300 AFL-CIO and General Electric Company, AAA Case #1530 0217
77, October 13, 1977 (Schenectady); International Union Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, AFL-CIO and General Electric
Company, AAA Case #53 30 0345 77, February 17, 1977 (Cleveland)
and International Union Electric, Radio & Machine Workers AFLCIO, Local 707 and General Electric Company, AAA Case #53 30
0040 78, January, 1979 (Cleveland).

-3three prior decisions either in its case presentation at the
hearing or in its brief.

Additionally, as further explained

below, its case on the merits does not allege let alone rely on
those circumstances set forth in my prior decisions under which
the Company's decision in determining the qualifications of
employees for upgradings would be reversable.
In the three prior decisions I held inter alia:
The....contract language, particularly
the phrase: "....who it finds are qualified
for such upgrading" (emphasis added) vests
the Company with the unilateral and discretionary authority to determine which employees are
qualified to be given consideration for a promotion. Of course the Company may not abuse that
discretion or exercise it in an arbitrary or
capricious manner.
The issue is not whether this Arbitrator thinks
the grievant is qualified or unqualified for
promotion.... but rather whether the Company's
decision that he was unqualified was so devoid
of factual basis and so unsupported by relevant
work criteria as to be arbitrary, capricious or
discriminatory.
Therefore the restriction on the Company which I found to
be applicable in the implementation of the initial step of
Article XXVIII Section 1 is that its unilateral determination
of which employees are qualified may not be arbitrary, capricious
or an abuse of discretion.
The Union in the instant case neither recognizes that
limited restriction, nor does it assert that the Company has
failed to meet it.

Instead the Union contends that based on

job performance, job duties and other factors, the grievants

-4were substantively qualified to be upgraded to the General
Maintenance

"A" (R-19) classification.

It asks this Arbitrator

to make a judgemental evaluation of the qualifications of the
grievants and to find, based on a de novo analysis of their
respective qualifications that the grievants
requisite qualifications.

possessed the

In short, I am asked to determine

not whether the Company's decisions were arbitrary, capricious
or an abuse of its discretion but whether
factual determinations.

it erred in its

Manifestly, the Union seeks the applic-

ation of a much different standard and a much wider factual
determination than what I held to be required of the Company
under my three prior interpretations of the pertinent contract
language.
By approaching the case in this manner, the Union, implicitly, does not claim that the Company's decisions regarding the grievants were arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of
discretion.

Therefore, in the absence of any such allegation,

either expressly or otherwise, and in view of my holding that
I remain bound by my three prior decisions, it is unnecessary
for me to analyze or particularize the various reasons set
forth in this record by the Company for its decision that the
grievants

did not possess the minimum qualifications required

for the upgradings they sought.

Suffice it to say that those

reasons if not persuasive in a de novo fact finding proceeding,
do at least rebut any claim of arbitrariness, capriciousness
or abuse of discretion.

Based on the standard I have previously

promulgated, I cannot find that the grievants

possessed the

minimum qualifications within my interpretation of the meaning
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of Section 1 of Article XXVIII of the contract.
Let me return to my first point, namely that the Union
has advanced neither argument nor evidence supportive of a
change in or reversal of my prior interpretations of Section 1
of Article XXVIII.

Presently I am satisfied that my prior

interpretations were correct.

I have not been shown otherwise.

In an appropriate case I am willing to hear new argument and
evidence on that issue and to consider reconsidering my position.
Whether or not I would be persuaded that I was wrong or that for
some other valid reason a change or modification is in order,
remains to be seen.

The point however is that the Union took

no steps in the instant proceeding towards that end, and hence
this case does not qualify for that purpose.
For the foregoing reasons, the Undersigned, duly designated
as the Arbitrator, makes the following AWARD
Within the meaning of the provisions of
the second sentence of Section 1 of
Article XXVIII as previously interpreted
and applied by this Arbitrator, the grievants, Raymond Berg and Ronald Seynave did
not have the minimum qualifications to be
upgraded to the General Maintenance "A"
(R-19) classification in December, 1978.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: November 6, 1979
STATE OF New York )gg.
COUNTY OF New York)
On this sixth day of November 1979, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Greater New York Health Care
Facilities Association
AWARD

and
Local 144 SEIU, AFL-CIO

In accordance with a written agreement between Local

144,

SEIU, AFL-CIO, and the Greater New York Health Care Facilities
Association (formerly the Metropolitan New York Nursing Home
Association), I have been named arbitrator to hear and resolve
i

non-wage contract issues.

In accordance with said agreement

dated April 4, 1978, hearings were duly held and briefs were
received from the respective sides.

The Union and the Association have submitted a vast number
of non-wage items for binding arbitration and award.

I have

determined that these issues shall be resolved by the issuance
of several awards.

At the present time I shall make the follow-

ing interim Awards, reserving jurisdiction on the other issues
for further Awards later.

The pension benefit proposal requested by the Union in an
amount of $300 per month effective April 1, 1978 (ref. Pension
Benefit Fund (1), page 2, Union proposal), is denied.
on the issue of pension benefit the following.

I award

The parties are

directed to increase the pension benefit at the following rates
and on the following effective dates:
January 1, 1979
December 15, 1979

Pension Benefit $225 per month
Pension Benefit $275 per month

-2December 15, 1980

The parties will meet to
discuss additional increases
in the Pension Benefit pursuant
to the Union's original positionc
In the event the parties are unable to resolve this issue, it
shall be referred back to the
arbitrator for a final determination.

With regard to the welfare fund contribution, the parties
have submitted the issue of the monthly rate of contribution.
The Union has requested a rate of 10.5%.
Association has proposed a rate of 4%.

Alternatively, the

After review of the

facts I make the following Award:
For the period April 1, 1978 to October 1,
1979 the rate in effect shall be 8%% per
month. The parties shall meet to discuss
the rate of contribution on September 1,
1979.
For the period October 1, 1979 to the
conclusion of the contract the parties shall
meet to discuss the contribution rate at that
time. In the event the parties are unable to
agree, they shall submit this issue to binding arbitration before this Arbitrator. The
Arbitrator shall be limited to an award range
no greater than 9%%.

With regard to the additional outstanding issues, I hereby Award that the following be submitted to a committee comprised
of no less than three Union representatives and three Association
representatives.

The committee shall review these issues and

make recommendations to the parties„
1. Job classifications that reflect the various
job titles in the clerical unit.
2. Job descriptions for all job classifications
to be included in the contract.
3. Establishing a file cabinet for ward clerks.
4. Requiring employers to set aside unused sick
pay on a monthly basis.

-35. Extra pay for aides and orderlies when left
short on a floor.
6. Extra pay for aides and orderlies when
working on two floors.
7. Additional pay for remaining employees
when laid off, discharged or retired
employees are not replaced.
I further Award that the parties establish a special
attorneys committee to update langauge in the grievance
procedures.
Pursuant to the Association's proposal for a forgiveness
of the balloon payment referred to in my Award of April 1977,
I hereby make the following Award:
1. Employers shall be granted an additional
six months grace period.
2. Employers that have fallen behind in their
current pay-outs are cautioned to correct
their delinquency in order not to risk loss
of the benefits of my April 14, 1977 Award.

DATED: May 8, 1979
STATE OF New York )
ss
COUNTY OF New York )

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

On this eighth day of May, 1979, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Greater New York Health Care
Facilities Association
AWARD
and

Local 144 SEIU, AFL-CIO

In accordance with a written agreement between Local 144,
SEIU, AFL-CIO, and the Greater New York Health Care Facilities
Association (formerly

the Metropolitan New York Nursing Home

Association), I have been named arbitrator to hear and resolve
non-wage contract issues.

In accordance with said agreement

dated April 4, 1978, hearings were duly held and briefs were
received from the respective sides.

The Union and the Association have submitted a vase number i
I
of non-wage items for binding arbitration and award. I have
determined that these issues shall be resolved by the issuance
of several awards.

At the present time I shall make the follow-

ing interim Awards, reserving jurisdiction on the other issues
for further Awards later.

The pension benefit proposal requested by the Union in an
amount of $300 per month effective April 1, 1978 (ref.

Pension

Benefit Fund (1), page 2, Union proposal), is denied.

I award

on the issue of pension benefit the following.

The parties are

directed to increase the pension benefit at the following rates
and on the following effective dates:
January 1, 1979
December 15, 1979

Pension Benefit $225 per month
Pension Benefit $275 per month

-2December 15, 1980

The parties will meet to
discuss additional increases
in the Pension Benefit pursuant
to the Union's original position.
In the event the parties are unable to resolve this issue, it
shall be referred back to the
arbitrator for a final determination.

With regard to the welfare fund contribution, the parties

i

have submitted the issue of the monthly rate of contribution.
The Union has requested a rate of 10.5%.
Association has proposed a rate of 4%.

Alternatively, the

After review of the

facts I make the following Award:
For the period April 1, 1978 to October 1,
1979 the rate in effect shall be 8%% per
month. The parties shall meet to discuss
the rate of contribution on September 1,
1979.
For the period October 1, 1979 to the
conclusion of the contract the parties shall
meet to discuss the contribution rate at that
time. In the event the parties are unable to
agree, they shall submit this issue to binding arbitration before this Arbitrator. The
Arbitrator shall be limited to an award range
no greater than 9%%.

With regard to the additional outstanding issues, I hereby Award that the following be submitted to a committee comprised
of no less than three Union representatives and three Association.
representatives.

The committee shall review these issues and

make recommendations

to the parties.

1. Job classifications that reflect the various
job titles in the clerical unit.
2. Job descriptions for all job classifications
to be included in the contract.
3. Establishing

a file cabinet for ward clerks.

4. Requiring employers to set aside unused sick
pay on a monthly basis.

-35. Extra pay for aides and orderlies when left
short on a floor.
6. Extra pay for aides and orderlies when
working on two floors.
7. Additional pay for remaining employees
when laid off, discharged or retired
employees are not replaced.
I further Award that the parties establish a special
attorneys committee to update langauge in the grievance
procedures.

Pursuant to the Association's proposal for a forgiveness
of the balloon payment referred to in my Award of April 1977,
I hereby make the following Award:
1. Employers shall be granted an additional
six months grace period,
2. Employers that have fallen behind in their
current pay-outs are cautioned to correct
their delinquency in order not to risk loss
of the benefits of my April 14, 1977 Award.

DATED: May 8, 1979
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )

_

Er/lc J. Schmerfltz
Arbitrator
/

On this eighth day of May, 1979, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.

SCOTT M: SCHWARTZ
&
Notary. Public State of New York
No. 24-462Woo
Qualified in Kings County
Term Expires March 30, 19*1

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Greater New York Health Care
Facilities, Association

AWARD

and
Local 144, SEIU, CIO

Pursuant to my continued authority over unresolved
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement between
the above named parties for the period April 1, 1978 through
March 31, 1981, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties, I make the following AWARD:
The following clause shall be included
in said collective bargaining agreement:
The Employer will not be required to make
contributions to the Funds on behalf of
casual employees who work less than the
ERISA casual vesting hours as specified
in the Trust indenture of Local 144 Nursing
Home Pension Fund in a calendar year.
In the event that total gross payroll
for employees exceeds 2070 of the total
gross annual payroll of the facility,
the employer shall be required to make
contributions on that amount exceeding
207o of the gross bargaining unit payroll.
The casuals shall be subject to union
security provisions of the contract, and
shall receive other contract benefits
applicable to casuals. To ensure against
abuses in the administration or implementation of the foregoing, the arbitrator
shall review this matter upon request of
either or both sides.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
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DATED: May 22, 1979
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )

.

On this 22nd day of May, 1979, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same

